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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is a collection of empirical essays that try to understand the way how ﬁnancial
markets propagate shocks across borders, and from the ﬁnancial sector to the real sector of an
economy. The word empirical means that we develop statistical methods to model, measure,
and test for such spillover eﬀects. The part collection of essays highlights that we do not even
pretend to cover the whole topic of the propagation of ﬁnancial shocks. This literature is vast and
includes both theoretical and empirical studies, exploring a multitude of potential channels of
propagation. Instead, what we have in mind, is to consider a few particular examples of ﬁnancial
spillovers: contagion, volatility spillovers, and the real sector eﬀects of uncertainty. Let us now
present these three concepts, around which our three essays are organized.
Contagion
The widespread use of the term contagion as related to ﬁnancial crises is a relatively new phe-
nomenon; before the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, references to contagion in economic and
ﬁnancial press were almost non-existent (Forbes (2012)). Although contagion is nowadays often
cited in the media as an explanation to an escalation of ﬁnancial turmoils, it is seldom that
commentators exactly deﬁne what they mean by it. On a general level it seems clear that con-
tagion should refer to a transmission of (negative) shocks, turmoil, or even panic, but a formal
inspection of the subject is not self-evident. The trouble is that, in the interconnected world of
today, one can expect the majority of shocks to one country to have an inﬂuence also elsewhere.
Certainly not all of them should be counted as contagion.
In their survey on the contagion literature, Pericoli & Sbracia (2003) list ﬁve deﬁnitions
of contagion that are generally used in the academic research. And, although the deﬁnitions
resemble each other, they are not quite the same. Their ﬁfth deﬁnition is basically the one
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Figure 1.1: Ten year government bond yields in Jan/1993–Sept/2013 (monthly data)
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that we follow in this thesis, according to it: ”contagion occurs when the transmission channel
(between markets or countries) changes after a shock in one market”. So, for example, Figure 1.1
shows the long term interest rates of several euro countries in 1993–2013. Clearly, the introduction
of the euro pushed the interest rates down and together, whereas the euro debt crisis has again
pushed them apart. Then, if we reckoned the ﬁrst ten years of the euro time (1999–2008) as
a normal period, we would consider there being contagion, say, between Greece and Portugal
if the transmission channels of shocks, or ﬁnancial linkages, between the bond markets of these
countries changed after the beginning of the Greek debt crisis in the late 2009/early 2010.
Volatility spillovers
Volatility, or standard deviation, of asset prices or stock market returns is a commonly used
measure of uncertainty. So, behind the concept of volatility spillovers, there is an idea that
uncertainty might be transmitted across countries during a crisis, or even that the transmission
of uncertainty is the reason for an escalation of ﬁnancial crises. As both concepts, contagion
and volatility spillovers, refer to an idea that, due to an international propagation of ﬁnancial
2
Figure 1.2: Volatility of stock market returns in Jan/2002–Oct/2013
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shocks, ﬁnancial crises might escalate, it appears then that volatility spillovers is a closely related
concept to contagion.1
But, although they closely resemble each other, we prefer to keep the concepts separated.
In particular, they help to highlight that spillover eﬀects can occur either in the ﬁrst moment
of ﬁnancial returns, or in the second moment (volatility). For instance, as Figure 1.2 shows,
it seems like a plausible hypothesis that during the euro debt crisis there has been volatility
spillovers between the national ﬁnancial markets.
Uncertainty and business cycle
Until now, the discussion on ﬁnancial spillovers has concentrated on the transmission of shocks
between the ﬁnancial markets of diﬀerent countries. If the eﬀects of a ﬁnancial shock were only
ﬁnancial, the Main Street should probably not need to be extremely worried about what happens
1Actually, one deﬁnition of contagion that Pericoli & Sbracia (2003) provide is the spillover of the volatility of
asset prices across countries.
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Figure 1.3: Monthly US stock market volatility, change in industrial production, and the US
recessions in Jan/1920–July/2013
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in the Wall Street. However, there are plenty of reasons to assume that ﬁnancial shocks have
spillover eﬀects also on the real sector of an economy. For example, as explained by Bernanke
(1983), higher uncertainty might induce ﬁrms to postpone their investments, which could then
aﬀect also employment (Bloom (2009)). Indeed, it appears that, during the last almost hundred
years in the US, higher volatility, which is our measure of uncertainty, at least coincide with
recessions and declining industrial production (Figure 1.3). The spillover of ﬁnancial shocks to
the real sector is the third theme of the thesis.
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces, on
a very general level, our main tools of analysis. After this, Section 1.2 summarizes the research
essays of the thesis.
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1.1 Models for Analyzing Spillovers
The three basic models that underlie the analysis of this thesis are vector autoregressive model,
structural vector autoregressive model, and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model.
In order to set ideas for the main chapters of this thesis, this section introduces the general
principals of these models. The more detailed discussion of the models of the essays is left for
the actual chapters.
1.1.1 Modeling Dynamic Interrelationships: VAR model
From the perspective of our analysis, the single most important statistical model is that of the
vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Since the seminal paper by Sims (1980), the VAR model
has been a standard tool in the toolbox of econometricians. Because there are many very good
textbook representations of the VAR model (see for example Hamilton (1994), or Lu¨tkepohl
(2007)), we will only sketch the basic idea behind the model, and, for simplicity, focus on the
ﬁrst order VAR model. This will prepare us for the discussion on the structural VAR (SVAR)
model and its identiﬁcation which is an important theme in all of our essays.
Consider n random variables, call them y1,t, y2,t, . . . , yn,t, that we observe on regular intervals
(t denotes the time period); as an example, take monthly stock market returns in n countries.
Then, the basic VAR model provides a simple framework to study the interrelationships between
the variables. By collecting the variables into a (n × 1) random vector yt = [y1,t, . . . , yn,t]′, the
ﬁrst order VAR model can be written as
yt = Ayt−1 + ut, (1.1)
where, for simplicity, we have assumed no intercepts, and where A is a (n×n) coeﬃcient matrix,
and ut is the (n× 1) error vector which is assumed to have zero mean and the covariance matrix
Σu = E(utu
′
t) = Ω. Also, it is assumed that ut and ut−k are uncorrelated to each other for all
k = 0 and k ∈ Z, where Z is the set of integers.
From the perspective of the eﬀects of the n variables on each other, let us specify two classes
of interrelationships: ﬁrst, there are the contemporaneous linkages between the variables. This
channel of interrelationship is measured with the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the matrix Ω, that is,
with the covariances between the individual elements of ut. This point is explained in the next
subsection where we discuss the structural VAR. Second, there are the dynamic interrelationships,
that is, the eﬀect of yk,t on yl,t+m for all k, l = 1, . . . , n and m ≥ 1. These eﬀects are, of course,
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dictated by the matrix A. And so, for example, the next-period eﬀect of a realization y1,t on
y2,t+1 equals a21y1,t, where a21 is the second row, ﬁrst column element of A. The long run
dynamic interrelationships are best captured with the impulse response (IR) functions.
In order to see the intuition behind the IR functions, consider equation (1.1). Clearly, we can
equally well write the following:
yt−1 = Ayt−2 + ut−1.
By now plugging yt−1 back into equation (1.1), and then, again, by solving yt−2 as a function of
yt−2 and ut−2, and so forth, we can write down the moving average representation of the VAR
model (1.1):
yt = ut +Aut−1 +A2ut−2 + . . .+Akut−k + . . . , (1.2)
where k ≥ 0. Hence, the long term dynamic eﬀect of, say, the ﬁrst element of ut−k, shock u1,t−k,
on y2,t depends on [A
k]2,1, the second row, ﬁrst column element of the matrix A
k. The full plot
of the values [Ak]2,1 as a function of k is the IR function of the ﬁrst element of ut on the second
variable of yt. The matrix A can be consistently estimated by the method of the ordinary least
squares (OLS). Once we have the estimate (Aˆ), a simple way to compute the IR functions is, for
instance, by simulating the responses of the (estimated) system in equation (1.1) to a shock of
magnitude one on each element of ut separately at ”period 1” while holding y0 = 0.
1.1.2 Modeling Contemporaneous Eﬀects: SVAR
One problem with the IR functions, as detailed above, is that, whenever there is no good reason
to assume that the covariance matrix Ω would be diagonal, it is not logical to assume a non-zero
realization solely of, say, the second element of ut, and hence, to use its IR function to study the
eﬀects of y2,t (speciﬁc shock) on the other variables of the system. So, whenever the elements of
ut are correlated to each other, as usually is the case with economic variables, we need to impose
some (structural) model to detail with the contemporaneous linkages between the elements of ut
and, hence, the elements of yt. A structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model is one approach
to do this.
The SVAR framework was developed for the purposes of policy analysis, especially to study
the eﬀects of monetary policy2, but it works ﬁne also for our purposes as we want to understand
the propagation of country or ﬁnancial market speciﬁc shocks to other countries or the real sector.
First, we need to assume n structural shocks ε1,t, . . . , εn,t that we collect into the (n× 1) vector
2For a very good discussion on the VAR and SVAR models from the perspective of the history of macroeconomic
literature, see Sims (2011).
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εt. The structural shocks are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated and to have unit variances,
and so the covariance matrix of εt is the (n×n) identity matrix, that is, we assume that Σε = In.
Second, assume that the reduced form error vector ut of the VAR model (1.1) is the following
linear function of the structural shocks εt:
ut = Bεt, (1.3)
where B is a (n× n) coeﬃcient matrix.3
Clearly, to take again our example of monthly stock market returns in n countries, assume for
a moment that, by somehow, we knew that the structural shocks ε1,t, . . . , εn,t corresponded to
country speciﬁc stock market shocks, respectively, then, the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the matrix
B would tell us the contemporaneous eﬀects between the stock markets. In this case, to answer
the question on what are the contemporaneous spillover eﬀects of a shock to, say, the stock
market of the second country (return y2,t), we should concentrate on the eﬀects of the second
structural shock ε2,t. Its contemporaneous eﬀect on country 1 equals b1,2, the ﬁrst row, second
column elements of B, the eﬀect on country 3 equals b3,2, and so forth. In order to see the
dynamic eﬀects, use equation (1.3) to write the moving average representation (1.2) of our VAR
model as
yt = Bεt +ABεt−1 + . . .+AkBεt−k + . . .
for k ≥ 0. Hence, the second column of the matrix AkB gives us the k-periods ahead eﬀect
of ε2,t. The problem is that, without any further assumptions about the SVAR model (1.3),
we cannot estimate the matrix B, the structural shocks are not identiﬁed, and, so, we can not
associate the structural shocks with the n countries of our example.
1.1.3 Identiﬁcation of SVAR
In order to see the problem with the identiﬁcation of the SVAR model (1.3), let us start from
the fact that we can always consistently estimate the (n×n) covariance matrix Ω of the reduced
form errors consistently with the standard estimations methods, such as the OLS, for example.
Call this estimate Ωˆ. Because a covariance matrix is symmetric, Ωˆ has only n(n + 1)/2 dis-
tinct elements whereas the matrix B has n2 elements. This means that, without any further
3The speciﬁcation of the SVAR model as in equation (1.3) corresponds to the B-model framework of the SVAR
model. This is probably the most widely used speciﬁcation of the SVAR model. Lu¨tkepohl (2007, 358–67) talks
of the B-model as well as other two frameworks. The diﬀerence between the frameworks come from whether we
focus on imposing the contemporaneous linkages on the elements of ut or directly on the elements of yt. Basically,
this is just a question of taste and does not aﬀect the analysis.
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assumptions, the system of equations
Ωˆ = BB′, (1.4)
which is implied by equation (1.3) and by our assumption that Σε = In, and where B
′ is the
transpose on B, is not well deﬁned. So, given any data y1, . . . ,yT , there is no way for us to solve
for the elements of B based on (1.4).
Another way to look at the identiﬁcation problem is to focus directly on equation (1.3). For
simplicity, assume n = 2, then this equation becomes
⎡
⎢⎣u1,t
u2,t
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣b11 b12
b21 b22
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣ε1,t
ε2,t
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣b11ε1,t + b12ε2,t
b22ε1,t + b22ε2,t
⎤
⎥⎦ . (1.5)
And so, whenever bkl = 0 for all k, l = 1, 2, both reduced form errors are linear combinations
of both structural shocks. Hence, always having our stock market returns example in mind, we
cannot associate the structural shocks with the countries. But, if we assumed, for instance, that
b12 = 0, the equation would become
⎡
⎢⎣u1,t
u2,t
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣ b11ε1,t+b12ε2,t
b22ε1,t + b22ε2,t
⎤
⎥⎦ , (1.6)
and so, at period t, the second structural shock would aﬀect only the stock market in country
2. This would allow us to identify the shock ε2,t as country 2 speciﬁc shock. The shock ε1,t
would still be allowed to aﬀect the stock markets in both countries at period t. If, for instance,
country 1 was a big economy whereas country 2 a small neighbor country, it would make sense
to interpret the shock ε1,t as the country 1 speciﬁc shock.
Assuming that the matrix B is a lower-triangular matrix as in our example (1.6), has prob-
ably been the most common method to identify a SVAR model. But it is also a controversial
identiﬁcation strategy as it assumes a speciﬁc recursive order of the contemporaneous eﬀects
between the variables of the system, and the estimations results can be sensitive on the selected
order of the variables. Especially, if using a triangular B matrix is not well justiﬁed by economic
theory, or by some other good reasons to justify a recursive ordering of the variables, one might
have hard time in defending one’s identifying assumptions.4 In the third essay of this thesis,
we will use a triangular B matrix to identify a ﬁnancial shock. There, it is argued that, on the
4Another famous strategy to identify a SVAR model was proposed by Blanchard & Quah (1989). They
considered unemployment and changes in output in the US and identify (the structural) demand and supply
shocks by assuming that only supply shocks can have permanent, long-run eﬀect on the output. For a good
discussion on the most common identiﬁcation methods, both recursive and non-recursive, and their shortcomings,
see Kilian (2011).
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monthly frequency, due to the persistence in the industrial production, ﬁnancial shocks should
not have any contemporaneous eﬀect on the change in industrial production.
From the perspective of our ﬁrst two essays, the traditional SVAR identiﬁcation methods are
problematic as they require us to make a priori restrictions on the matrix B. In those essays our
desire is to study (possible changes in) the contemporaneous linkages between ﬁnancial variables
during the euro debt crisis. So, being forced to restrict them from the start is something that
we would be willing to avoid. Hence, in those chapters we rely on some more recent ideas of
identifying a SVAR model based on heteroskedasticity or non-normalities in data (such methods
were introduced, for example, by Rigobon (2003b), Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2008), and Lanne &
Lu¨tkepohl (2010)). And actually, these methods allow for us to test for potential restrictions on
B.
In order to see how heteroskedasticity might help us to identify a SVAR model, we take a
simple example from Lu¨tkepohl (2012) (which is also a good survey on the literature). Assume
n = 2 and, also, consider a sample of T time periods, which we divide in two and assume that,
for the ﬁrst time interval (t = 1, . . . , T1), the covariance matrix of the reduced form errors equals
Ω1, and that during the second sub sample (t = T1+1, . . . , T ) it equals Ω2 (and, of course, that
Ω1 = Ω1). There is a result in linear algebra according to which the two covariance matrices
can be decomposed in the following way (see, for example, the appendix in Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl
(2010)):
Ω1 = B˜B˜
′ and Ω2 = B˜ΨB˜′, (1.7)
where B˜ is a general (2 × 2) matrix, and Ψ = diag(ψ1, ψ2) is a diagonal matrix. Furthermore,
assume also that the covariance matrix (Σε) of the structural shocks changes in the following
way:
Σε =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
I2, when t = 1, . . . , T1,
Ψ, when t = T1 + 1, . . . , T,
(1.8)
where I2 is the (2 × 2) identity matrix, and Ψ as in equation (1.7). Especially, notice that,
in equation (1.8), although we allow for heteroskedasticity in the distribution of the structural
shocks, we maintain the assumption that the individual shocks are mutually uncorrelated.
Hence, now, a natural way to identify the structural shocks of the SVAR model in equation
(1.3) is to assume that, for the ﬁrst subsample, the matrix B of equation (1.3) equals the
matrix B˜ in equation (1.7), and that, during the second subsample, the matrix B equals B˜Ψ1/2.
The beneﬁt is that, unlike the system of equation (1.4), we now have the system of equation
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(1.7) which is well deﬁned as it gives the following six equations with six unknown parameters
(b11, b12, b21, b22, ψ1, ψ2):
ω11,1 = b
2
11 + b
2
12,
ω12,1 = b11b21 + b12b22,
ω22,1 = b
2
21 + b
2
22,
ω11,2 = ψ1b
2
11 + ψ2b
2
12,
ω12,2 = ψ1b11b21 + ψ2b12b22,
ω22,2 = ψ1b
2
21 + ψ2b
2
22,
where ωij,k refers to the row i, column j element of the covariance matrix Ωk with i, j, k = 1, 2.
Hence, given data, we can solve the parameters. (Remember that the elements of matrices Ω1
and Ω2 can always be consistently estimated, hence, we can treat them as known variables.)
1.1.4 Eﬀects of Uncertainty: GARCH Model
As Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show, ﬁnancial market volatility can sometimes increase for extended
periods of time. Since Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986), a standard approach to model this
phenomenon called volatility clustering is to consider a model of generalized autoregressive con-
ditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH). In our third essay, we will use a standard GARCH(1,1)
model to measure uncertainty, so let us brieﬂy describe it here (for a detailed discussion, an
interested reader should consult, for example, Lu¨tkepohl (2007)). Assume a univariate random
variable, call it ut, which has zero mean, conditional variance E(u
2
t |It−1) = ω2t , where It−1 de-
notes the observations of ut up to to time period t− 1, and follows the subsequent GARCH(1,1)
model:
ut = ωtεt,
ω2t = α+ βu
2
t−1 + γω
2
t−1, (1.9)
where the shock εt is assumed to be identically and independently distributed, and α, β and γ
are parameters.
The main point is to see that, according to equation (1.9), the conditional volatility of ut
depends on its ﬁrst lag and the ﬁrst lags of ut. So, from the perspective of our discussion, assume
ut corresponds to stock market return, a large realization of ut today will increase the conditional
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variance (ωt+1), and hence uncertainty, from the next period onwards. We will measure the real
sector eﬀects of uncertainty by considering the eﬀect of ωt+1 on the growth rate of industrial
production (in a multivariate setting).
1.2 Summary of the Essays
Let us now brieﬂy summarize the essays and review their main empirical ﬁndings. The three
essays consider volatility spillovers in stock markets, dynamic and contemporaneous interrela-
tionships (or contagion) in the government bond markets, and the real sector eﬀects of ﬁnancial
shocks, respectively.
1.2.1 Chapter 2: On Detection of Volatility Spillovers in Overlapping
Stock Markets
The ﬁrst essay considers volatility spillovers in stock markets. The starting point of the analysis
is the model proposed by King & Wadhwani (1990) which is a theoretical model to explain
volatility spillovers in stock markets. According to the model, volatility spillovers are due to
there being two types of investors, informed and uniformed. As the uniformed investors know
that part of the changes in stock market prices reﬂect the private information of the informed
investors, they are prone to react to price changes. This creates a potential channel for volatility
to spill across national stock markets.
The model of King & Wadhwani (1990) is not identiﬁed as such. The contribution of the essay
is to interpret the model as a SVAR model and, then, use non-normalities of stock market data to
identify the model. More precisely, we use the SVAR identiﬁcation method propposed by Lanne
& Lu¨tkepohl (2010). The model can be estimated with the method of maximum likelihood, and
volatility spillovers can be tested with the standard likelihood ratio test.
In the empirical application of the essay we consider stock markets of Greece, Italy, Germany,
Ireland, and Spain in 2010–2011 and ﬁnd evidence of volatility spillovers. Especially, the stock
market volatilities of the large countries (Italy and Germany in particular) have large eﬀects on
all countries, both large and small. On the contrary, the stock market volatilities of the small
countries (Ireland and Greece) mostly have eﬀects on each other.
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1.2.2 Chapter 3: Transmission of Government Default Risk in the
Eurozone
The second essay extends the SVAR model of Favero & Giavazzi (2002) to analyze the reasons
behind the rising ten year government bond spreads in the eurozone during the recent euro debt
crisis. Also, we propose an alternative way to implement the ”contagion” test of Favero and
Giavazzi. The implementation is based on combining the ideas of Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2008,
2010) on how to use heteroskedasticity and non-normalities of data to identify a SVAR model.
The SVAR model of the essay allows us to test for the stability of the contemporaneous and
dynamic interrelationships between the spreads, as well as changing intercepts which we interpret
as country speciﬁc risk factors. In the empirical application, we analyze the government bond
spreads of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy over the German bond in the years 2001–
2012. Although contagion seems to be an important factor in explaining the increasing spreads
during the crisis, there are substantial diﬀerences between the countries. For Ireland, Italy and
Spain also the idiosyncratic risk factors seem to play an important role. Also the Irish and
Italian spreads become dynamically less interdependent with the spreads of the other countries.
For Greece and Portugal contagion seems to be an important factor to explain the increases in
their spreads.
1.2.3 Chapter 4: Uncertainty and Business Cycles
The third essay considers the real sector eﬀects of uncertainty and, for this purpose, introduces a
speciﬁcation of the vector autoregressive model with autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
in mean eﬀects to model the joint dynamics of the monthly US stock market return and the change
in industrial production in 1919–2013. The model is an extension of the multivariate GARCH
model of Vrontos et al. (2003) and allows us to decompose the eﬀect of a stock market crash on
industrial production into two components, the eﬀect of negative returns and the eﬀect of higher
volatility. The latter eﬀect is our proxy for business cycle eﬀects of uncertainty.
The empirical analysis ﬁnds uncertainty in the US to be signiﬁcantly countercyclical. This
result is robust for varied time periods. Also, the impulse response analysis shows that a monthly
drop of ten percent in stock market prices is followed by a cumulative decline of three percent in
the industrial production. Of this decline, around two thirds are explained by higher uncertainty.
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Chapter 2
On Detection of Volatility
Spillovers in Overlapping Stock
Markets
Abstract1
This paper applies a recently proposed structural vector autoregressive model identi-
ﬁcation method to an established, previously unidentiﬁed theoretical model of stock
market volatility spillovers. The structural model is identiﬁed and can be estimated
with the method of maximum likelihood. Volatility spillovers can then be tested with
the standard likelihood ratio test. This way our test, unlike the majority of the exist-
ing volatility spillover tests, has its foundations ﬁrmly in the economic theory. Our
test is developed for fully overlapping stock markets. The empirical application of
the paper considers stock markets of the eurozone in the years 2010–2011. Evidence
of volatility spillovers is found.
1This chapter is based on an article with the same title, published in the Journal of Empirical Finance, 22,
140–158, 2013.
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2.1 Introduction
Periods of ﬁnancial distress are usually accompanied by simultaneous increases in volatility of the
world’s ﬁnancial markets. The literature on volatility spillovers claims that these international
volatility clusters are due to volatility being transmitted across borders; a rise in volatility in
one country increases volatility elsewhere. But what causes the rise in volatility in the origin
country? This paper combines two themes in the literature: the economic theory of volatility
and the statistical modeling of its spillovers.
Since the seminal papers by Engle et al. (1990) and Hamao et al. (1990), volatility spillovers
have been extensively studied. Quite naturally, diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the generalized autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model have been popular.2 The majority of
the empirical studies ﬁnd evidence of international interdependencies in volatilities. However,
most of these models are purely statistical. The theoretical literature on the causes of the inter-
dependencies is much more limited (Soriano & Climent, 2006). Furthermore, papers trying to
estimate a theoretical model that would explain both volatility and its transmission are rare.
We will try to ﬁll this void by proposing a way to estimate the classical theoretical model
of King & Wadhwani (1990) (henceforth, the KW model). It is a rational expectations model
with informed and uninformed investors. Stock market returns and their volatilities depend
on arriving new information that only the informed investors observe. Volatility spillovers are,
then, the result of the uniformed investors’ eﬀorts to estimate the informed investors’ private
information by solving a signal-extraction problem where price changes act as signals. We will
concentrate on the simplest version of the KW model, that of fully overlapping stock markets.
The author is not aware of any other paper that would have estimated the KW model for
overlapping markets.
Unfortunately, King and Wadhwani were unable to identify their structural model. To do
this, we will augment the model with an additional assumption about the variables’ distribution.
Especially, we assume the daily stock market returns follow a mixed-normal distribution. Then,
by interpreting the KW model as a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model, we can
use a recent identiﬁcation method by Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010). However, as emphasized by
Lanne and Lu¨tkepohl, their identiﬁcation method ”only” guarantees statistical identiﬁcation of a
SVAR model. This means that the identiﬁed structural shocks are guaranteed to be orthogonal,
a generally accepted (minimum) requirement in the SVAR literature. Hence, the method does
not guarantee that the identiﬁed structural shocks would have any economically meaningful
2For example, Soriano & Climent (2006) provide an extensive survey on the volatility spillover literature. Also,
Hong (2001), and Savva (2009) brieﬂy review this literature.
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interpretation.3
In our context, this means that the Lanne-Lu¨tkepohl method only provides partial identi-
ﬁcation of the KW model. To fully identify it, this paper suggests to use the Google search
engine data as an external source of information. After this the model can be estimated with
the method of maximum likelihood and volatility spillovers tested with the standard likelihood
ratio test. In the empirical application of the paper, we estimate the KW model using the euro-
zone stock market data from 2010 to 2011 with ﬁve countries: Italy, Ireland, Spain, Greece, and
Germany. We ﬁnd evidence of volatility spillovers.
This paper is related to several diﬀerent topics in the volatility spillover–and also contagion–
literature. First, the main idea of the Lanne-Lu¨tkepohl identiﬁcation method is to identify a
system of simultaneous equations by exploiting non-normalities in data; this relates our model
to the papers that use some speciﬁc characteristic of the probability distribution of data as an ad-
ditional source of information for structural model identiﬁcation. For example, Rigobon (2003a)
presents a heteroskedasticity-based identiﬁcation method that has been successfully applied4.
A common feature with the non-normality and heteroskedasticity based approaches is that,
contrary to the more traditional identiﬁcation methods, they try to avoid imposing any speciﬁc
(usually zero) restrictions on the parameters of the instantaneous eﬀects between the countries5.
Given that the objective of the volatility spillover models is usually to test the statistical sig-
niﬁcance of these parameters, it is of course a desirable feature of our approach if we can avoid
restricting any of them ex ante. The Lanne-Lu¨tkepohl and Rigobon methods diﬀer, however, in
that the latter assumes heteroskedasticity in the structural shocks whereas the former focuses on
non-normalities (or heteroskedasticity) in the distribution of the reduced form errors.
Second, many papers study volatility spillovers with (latent) factor models.6 The KW model
can be interpreted as an explanation for common factors because in the KW model news can
be relevant to equity valuations in several countries. Such news could then be interpreted as
unobserved common variables. However, unlike usually done in the latent factor models7, the
KW model does not model in conditional heteroskedasticity. Assuming news having a GARCH
eﬀect could be an extension of the model considered here.8
3The distinction between statistical and ”economically meaningful” identiﬁcation is further discussed in Her-
wartz & Lu¨tkepohl (2011), and Lu¨tkepohl (2012).
4See, for example, Caporale et al. (2005b,a), Rigobon (2002), Rigobon & Sack (2003).
5Of course, sometimes the market structure under consideration, or diﬀerences in trading hours allow for such
zero restrictions, see for example Billio & Caporin (2010) for an application. Favero & Giavazzi (2002), in contrast,
identify their model by restricting the dynamic–not contemporaneous–eﬀects of the system.
6See, for example, King et al. (1994) and Dungey & Martin (2007).
7In fact Sentana & Fiorentini (2001) show that variation in conditional covariance is important for the identi-
ﬁcation of dynamic factor models.
8Lin et al. (1994) estimate two variants of a model similar to the KW model, one with homoskedastic news
process and one with heteroskedastic news. However, their model identiﬁcation is based having stock markets
that do not overlap, namely New York and Tokyo. Hence, their approach is not directly applicable to our context.
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Finally, one prevailing theme in the ﬁnance literature is transmission of information across
countries. Wongswan (2006) shows that information is transmitted from the world’s major
economies to smaller ones, and that there is a short-lived volatility eﬀect in the target countries’
stock markets. Our paper shows that, in addition to information–and hence volatility–spreading
from large countries to small countries, it gets transmitted also between small countries as well
as between large ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the KW model. Section 2.3
shows how to identify and estimate it, and to test for volatility spillovers. Section 2.4 provides
the empirical example. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Model of Volatility Spillovers
The KWmodel of volatility spillovers is a rational expectations model with two types of investors,
informed and uninformed. Domestic investors are always the informed ones whereas foreign
investors remain uninformed. The model is a variant of the Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) model on
the impossibility of competitive equilibrium prices to fully reveal all information. The exposition
of the KW model in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3 follows quite closely that in the original article.
2.2.1 Two Countries Case
Let us begin with only two countries, countries 1 and 2. There is one stock market in each country.
All investors are risk neutral and there is no international (cross-border) stock trading9. Also,
both markets are assumed to be open around the clock, so the opening hours of the markets are
fully overlapping.
There are two types of information: systematic and idiosyncratic, denoted by ε and v, respec-
tively. Systematic information is relevant globally to all stock markets whereas the idiosyncratic
only to local stock prices. So, any news, denoted by η, can be of either type of information.
However, the problem for foreign investors is that they never observe the type of information of
a piece of domestic news. Only local investors observe (or correctly interpret) it.10 So, in the
9According to King and Wadhwani, if we allowed risk neutral investors with possibility of arbitrage between
national stock markets, in the equilibrium all information would be revealed. Prohibiting international trade
in stocks makes a non-fully-revealing equilibrium (equilibrium with information asymmetries) possible with risk-
neutral investors. This modeling strategy simpliﬁes the model’s structure without aﬀecting the general conclusions.
Alternatively, one could permit international stock trading and obtain the non-fully-revealing equilibrium by
assuming risk-averse investors. For more discussion on alternative assumptions, see the original paper.
10Given the modern information technology and international news agencies, the assumption that foreign in-
vestors are not able to observe (or interpret) information as well as domestic investors might seem too restrictive–
surely news are widespread almost instantaneously. However, King and Wadhwani point out that there is a
diﬀerence between news in the media and information as an assessment on consequences of the news to equity
valuations. For example, the ﬁndings of Groß-Klußmann & Hautsch (2011) support this important distinction.
Hence, as valuation assessment is costly, some investors might prefer to try to infer the new valuations from the
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KW model, domestic investors are always the ones who are informed and foreign investors stay
uninformed.
Hence, in our two countries case, both information types, ε and v, come in two diﬀerent forms
depending on where they are observed, in country 1 or country 2. This said, when we denote by
η
(i)
t news in country i at period t, it can be decomposed in the following way:
η
(i)
t = ε
(i)
t + v
(i)
t for i = 1, 2, (2.1)
where the superscripts on the information variables ε and v emphasize the country where the
information is observed. The four information variables–ε
(1)
t , ε
(2)
t , v
(1)
t and v
(2)
t –follow white noise
processes and, so, are uncorrelated to each other.
Any change in a country’s stock market price index S during a time period is the result of
new information released during that period. Because investors never directly observe systematic
information in foreign countries, they need to estimate it. Let Ei denote the expectation operator
of country i investors conditional on all information they observe at period t. The stock market
price indexes of our two countries will then follow these two equations:
ΔS
(1)
t = ε
(1)
t + α12E1
(
ε
(2)
t
)
+ v
(1)
t , (2.2)
ΔS
(2)
t = α21E2
(
ε
(1)
t
)
+ ε
(2)
t + v
(2)
t , (2.3)
where ΔS
(i)
t denotes the percentage return in country i’s stock market in the period between
time t − 1 and t. This is measured by the change in the logarithm of the price index. The
parameter αij captures the importance of systemic information observed in country j on the
equity prices in country i.
Assume that the only information available to the (domestic) investors of a country about
the systematic information observed elsewhere is the change in the foreign equity prices. So,
for example, considering the signal extraction problem of country 1’s investors, the conditional
expectation E1(ε
(2)
t ) = 0 whenever they observe a non-zero ΔS(2)t . However, ΔS(2)t is a function
of both the systematic information ε
(2)
t and the idiosyncratic information v
(2)
t . Hence, there is
noise in the signal. Also, country 1’s investors understand that, while they try to estimate ε
(2)
t ,
the investors of country 2 undergo a similar type of reasoning in trying to estimate ε
(1)
t based
on the price changes in country 1. Hence, investors in country 1 will adjust their expectations
accordingly. Symmetric reasoning applies to the investors in country 2.
market price changes. Also, some (institutional) investors might be specialized to speciﬁc regions and, so, possess
better technical and informational capabilities to infer regional speciﬁc relevant information.
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When we assume the distributions of the stochastic news processes and the values of the model
parameters are common knowledge, the investors can solve their signal extraction problems. The
minimum-variance estimators are
Ei
(
ε
(j)
t
)
= λj
[
ΔS
(j)
t − αjiEj
(
ε
(i)
t
)]
,
where
λj = σ
2
ε(j)/
(
σ2ε(j) + σ
2
v(j)
)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i = j. Here σ2x denotes the (known) variance of x. By substituting these
estimators into equations (2.2) and (2.3), and using the decomposition of country i news η
(i)
t in
equation (2.1), we get
ΔS
(1)
t = (1− α12α21λ1λ2) η(1)t + α12λ2ΔS(2)t , (2.4)
ΔS
(2)
t = (1− α12α21λ1λ2) η(2)t + α21λ1ΔS(1)t . (2.5)
Because the parameters α and λ are not separately identiﬁable, we combine them into a new
parameter β:
βij = αijλj (2.6)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i = j. Solving the system of equations (2.4)–(2.5) with respect to the price
changes yields us the equilibrium laws of motions for the stock market returns as a function of
the news variables η
(1)
t and η
(2)
t :
ΔS
(1)
t = η
(1)
t + β12η
(2)
t , (2.7)
and
ΔS
(2)
t = β21η
(1)
t + η
(2)
t . (2.8)
The variances and covariances of the market returns are
Var
(
ΔS
(1)
t
)
= σ2η(1) + (β12)
2
σ2η(2) . (2.9)
Var
(
ΔS
(2)
t
)
= σ2η(2) + (β21)
2
σ2η(1) . (2.10)
Cov
(
ΔS
(1)
t ,ΔS
(2)
t
)
= β21σ
2
η(1) + β12σ
2
η(2) .
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This system consists of four unknown parameters (ση(1) , ση(2) , β12, β21) and three equations, so the
KWmodel is unidentiﬁed. In section 2.3, we will augment the model with a speciﬁc distributional
assumption. This additional assumption, it is argued, provides us the necessary additional
information for the identiﬁcation.
2.2.2 Volatility Spillovers
From equations (2.9) and (2.10) we can solve, for example,
Var
(
ΔS
(1)
t
)
= (1− β212β21)σ2η(1) + β212Var
(
ΔS
(2)
t
)
.
The volatility of country 1’s market returns would be the square root of this. Clearly, whenever,
β12 = 0 (β21 = 0), there is not any volatility spillovers from country 2 (1) to country 1 (2). Also,
the greater is the absolute value of βij , the greater will be the volatility spillover eﬀect from
country j to country i.
This said, a testing of the volatility spillovers boils down to testing whether in our structural
model
β12 = β21 = 0 (no spillovers)
or
βij = 0 for some i = j (some spillovers).
Notice that, if for example we had β12 = 0 together with β21 = 0, we would have spillovers from
country 1 to country 2 but not vice versa.
It seems worthwhile to shortly consider how, for example, a ﬁnding β12 = 0 should be
interpreted. Remember that β12 = α12λ2, so as long as we assume that both information
variables observed in country 2 are genuine random variables (both σ2
ε(2)
and σ2
v(2)
are non-zero
real numbers which means λ2 = 0), then, whenever β12 = 0, we must have α12 = 0. So, there
would not be any volatility spillovers from country 2 to country 1, for the simple reason that the
systematic information observed in country 2 is not considered relevant for the equity valuations
in country 1. The investors in country 1 would know this and, hence, they would not try to infer
information component ε(2) from the price changes in country 2’s markets. There would still,
however, exist the information asymmetry in the sense that the investors in country 1 would not
be able to directly observe ε(2). Only this time, the information asymmetry would not matter.
Conversely, the greater is the relevance of ε(2) on the equity valuations in country 1, that is
the greater is the absolute value of α12, the greater will–ceteris paribus–the volatility spillover
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eﬀect be. Notice, however, that because we are unable to identify parameter α12 from λ2, simply
by observing a large (estimated) value of parameter β12 does not tell us whether or not the
systematic information in country 2 is very relevant for country 1’s markets. A large value of
β12 could also be the results of large λ2 which would mean the variance of ε
(2) is large compared
to the variance of country 2 speciﬁc idiosyncratic information v(2).
2.2.3 General Model of Volatility Spillovers
As King and Wadhwani show in their paper, the KW model generalizes to a multiple country
case in a straightforward manner. Assume n ≥ 2. The countries’ stock market price changes are
given by the equation below (comparable to equations (2.2) and (2.3))
ΔSt = ηt +Aet, (2.11)
where ΔSt is a n × 1 vector of the price changes at period t, ηt is a n × 1 vector of news at
period t with the typical element
η
(i)
t = ε
(i)
t + v
(i)
t
being the news released in country i, A is a n×n coeﬃcient matrix with the typical element αij ,
i, j = 1, . . . , n, and αii = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n (all the main diagonal elements), and ﬁnally et
is a n× 1 vector of the conditional expectations on the systemic informations ε(i), i = 1, . . . , n,
held by the (foreign) investors in the markets j = i at period t.
The solution to the signal extraction problem is
et = Λ (ΔSt −Aet) , (2.12)
where Λ is a n× n diagonal matrix with parameter λi as the ith element on its main diagonal.
Then, by combining equations (2.11) and (2.12), and solving forΔSt, one gets the laws of motion
of the price changes in the n market case as a function of the news in the n countries:
ΔSt = (In +B)ηt (2.13)
where B = AΛ is a n× n matrix, and its ijth element βij is the response of the market i prices
to the news in market j. The matrix In is a n × n identity matrix. Again, a test for volatility
spillovers, for example, from country j to country j should test whether or not the element βij
equals zero. Notice that by construction the main diagonal elements βii for all i = 1, . . . , n are
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zero.
2.2.4 On Information Asymmetry
In the KW model it is assumed that only domestic investors are able to correctly interpret
news on their country. Foreigners remain uninformed. Is there any empirical support for such
information asymmetries?
Frankel & Schmukler (1996) analyze diﬀerences in the Mexican stock market valuations and
the valuations of the Mexican closed-end country funds that were traded in the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). They argue that around the Mexican devaluation in December 1994 the local
investors were better informed than the international investors, and so they were more pessimistic
and better prepared to react to negative local news.
More recently, Chen & Choi (2012) analyze the stock market valuations of the 56 Canadian
companies listed both in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the NYSE. They ﬁnd evidence
of the local (TSX) investors being better informed than the foreign (NYSE) investors. This
information asymmetry, they argue, explains the small share price premiums detected in the
NYSE prices over the TSX prices of these companies. Also, according to Chan et al. (2008)
the information asymmetry between Chinese and foreign investors is able to explain the price
diﬀerences between the locally owned (A-)shares and the foreign own (B-)shares of the Chinese
companies.
2.2.5 The KW Model & the Theoretical Contagion Literature
In the KW model, because of asymmetric information, the idiosyncratic country shocks are
transmitted across the borders. The authors also show that the correlations between the coun-
tries’ market returns are higher in the KW model than in a comparable full information model.
Hence, the authors label the KW model as a ”contagion” model. This lexicon is in-line with
the theoretical contagion literature where many authors deﬁne contagion as transmission of an
idiosyncratic shock–or crisis–from one country to other countries.11
Similar to the KW model, Kodres & Pritsker (2002) analyze contagion in a set up with in-
formed and uniformed investors. Then, in their model also, contagion is the consequence of the
uninformed investors trying to infer the informed investors’ private information from the price
changes. One interesting insight of the Kodres and Pritsker analysis is that the ”magnitude”
11See, for example, Kaminsky & Reinhart (2000), Kodres & Pritsker (2002), Corsetti et al. (2005), Dungey
et al. (2005), Pesaran & Pick (2007). For surveys on the contagion literature, see for example Pericoli & Sbracia
(2003), Dungey et al. (2005), Dornbusch et al. (2000), Forbes (2012). The empirical contagion literature deﬁnes
contagion slightly diﬀerently, see for example Forbes & Rigobon (2002).
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of contagion depends on the relative share of the informed investors over the uninformed ones.
Hence, for any given number of uninformed investors, increasing the number of informed in-
vestors, in the limit, makes contagion vanish. The intuition is that, as the relative share of the
informed investors increases, the price system becomes more informative than before and, hence,
better reﬂects the informed investors’ private information.
Both, King and Wadhwani as well as Kodres and Pritsker, consider a case where the numbers
of informed and uninformed investors are exogenously given. However, because information is
costly (individual time and eﬀort, payments for professional analysts, etc.), some investors might
actually prefer to stay ignored about the detailed macroeconomic conditions of a country. Calvo &
Mendoza (2000) analyze investors’ incentives to pay information costs. In their model an investor
chooses either to pay for information on a country’s fundamentals or to remain uninformed. In
the latter case she would simply track a generic, global stock market index. Hence, the number of
informed investors becomes a model endogenous variable. The authors show that, once there are
exogenous information costs, or binding institutional or legislative constraints on short-selling,
the more global the world ﬁnancial markets become, the more tempting it is for a rational investor
to stay uninformed. The intuition behind the result is that, for example, the constraints on the
short-selling limit the informed investors’ opportunities to beneﬁt from their private information.
Hence, the expected value of country speciﬁc information decreases. This, then, decreases the
incentives to pay for such information. Meanwhile, more global ﬁnancial markets permit investors
to more easily, by following a general market index, enjoy the beneﬁts of asset diversiﬁcation.
2.3 Estimation of the Structural Model
Consider the KW model with n countries in equation (2.13). By redeﬁning
ut = (In +B)ηt,
we get the following simple identity:
ΔSt = ut. (2.14)
Equation (2.14) can be interpreted as a zero order reduced form vector autoregressive (VAR)
model. The vector ut is the reduced form error vector. Throughout the paper the stochastic
process described by this VAR model is assumed to be stationary. When considering the fact
that the data will consist of the changes in the stock market price indexes, this assumption seems
reasonable.
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Alternatively, we can redeﬁne
B˜ = (In +B) .
In this case, we can write equation (2.13) as
ΔSt = B˜ηt. (2.15)
This, in its turn, can be interpreted as a zero order SVAR model. The n× 1 random vector ηt
(the KW model’s news vector) denotes the model’s structural shocks which are uncorrelated to
each other. By combining equations (2.14) and (2.15) we then get the reduced form errors as a
function of the structural shocks (news);
ut = B˜ηt. (2.16)
This representation corresponds to the so-called B-model framework of the SVAR model (see,
for example, Lu¨tkepohl (2007, 362–64)) where the n-dimensional reduced form error term (ut)
depends on the n structural shocks (ηt) via a n × n coeﬃcient matrix (B˜). The fundamental
question of the SVAR literature is how to estimate the coeﬃcient matrix and, hence, identify the
structural shocks.
If we denote the covariance matrix of the reduced from errors as Σu and that of the structural
shocks as Ση (which is by assumption diagonal), we get from equation (2.16) that
Σu = B˜ΣηB˜
′.
Typically, a SVAR model is normalized by assuming Ση = In. This gives us the following system
of n equations:
Σu = B˜B˜
′ (2.17)
where Σu can be estimated consistently with standard estimation methods. However, as the
matrix B˜ consists of n2 unknown parameters and equation (2.17) provides us only n (n+ 1) /2
independent equations (a covariance matrix is always symmetric), we need some extra informa-
tion to be able to estimate the matrix B˜.
One standard method to identify a SVAR model is to use economic theory or institutional
knowledge to directly restrict (to zero) suﬃciently many elements of B˜. Other methods include,
for example, restricting the signs of the impulse responses of the system, or restricting long-
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run eﬀects of the structural shocks on the observed variables.12 However, most of the standard
identiﬁcation methods are not suitable for our SVAR model. In our context, the non-diagonal
elements of B˜ are the volatility spillover coeﬃcients. Our very goal is to estimate them and test
whether or not some (or all) of them equal to zero.
2.3.1 Identiﬁcation Based on Non-normalities
Assume the reduced form errors, that is the stock market returns, follow a mixed-normal distri-
bution:
ut =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u1t ∼ N (0,Σ1) with probability γ,
u2t ∼ N (0,Σ2) with probability 1− γ.
(2.18)
Here N (0,Σ) refers to a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and a n×n covariance
matrix Σ. The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is the mixture probability. In order to γ being identiﬁable,
the covariance matrices Σ1 and Σ2 must be distinct. Parts of Σ1 and Σ2 may still be identical.
According to the distributional assumption (2.18), the random vector ut has zero as its mean
and the covariance matrix γΣ1 + (1− γ)Σ2. Notice that the distributional assumption does not
violate the assumptions of the KW model. In the KW model it is only assumed that the news
(elements of ηt) are uncorrelated.
13 Because the stock market price changes are the result of
the news being multiplied by the matrix B˜, the price changes do not need to be uncorrelated.
The KW model does not make any further assumptions on how the stock market price changes
are distributed. We, however, assume that they follow a mixed-normal distribution. Also notice
that the distribution (2.18) is non-normal. Because non-normality is a general feature of ﬁnancial
time series, the assumption seems reasonable also in this respect.
Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010) show that, given the mixed-normal distribution (2.18), there exists
a diagonal matrix Ψ = diag (ψ1, . . . , ψn) with ψi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, and a nonsingular n×n
matrix W such that Σ1 = WW
′ and Σ2 = WΨW′.14 As long as all the elements ψi > 0
are distinct, the matrix W is unique apart from changing all signs in a column. The covariance
matrix of the reduced form error vector ut can then be written as
Σu = γWW
′ + (1− γ)WΨW′ =W (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)W′ (2.19)
12Kilian (2011) provides a good survey on the diﬀerent SVAR model identiﬁcation methods.
13Notice that the KW model assumes that the agents know the distribution that the news follow. The agent’s
problem has stayed the same even though we, as econometricians, assume that the observed market returns follow
a mixed-normal distribution.
14The decomposition of the matrices Σ1 and Σ1 is the result of them being symmetric and positive deﬁnite
matrices. For details, see the appendix in Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010, 167).
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A comparison of this with equation (2.17) lets us to choose
B˜ =W (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)1/2 . (2.20)
The model given by the reduced form representation in equation (2.14), the distribution
(2.18), and the decomposition of the covariance matrices Σ1 and Σ2 can be estimated by the
method of maximum likelihood (ML). The distribution of ΔSt can be written as
15
f (ΔSt) = γ det (W)
−1
exp
{
− 12ΔS′t (WW′)−1ΔSt
}
+(1− γ) det (Ψ)−1/2 det (W)−1 exp
{
− 12ΔS′t (WΨW′)−1ΔSt
}
.
Collecting all the parameters into the vector Θ, the log-likelihood function becomes
lT (Θ) =
T∑
t=1
logf (ΔSt) .
This can be maximized with the standard nonlinear optimization algorithms.
There is one severe limitation in a straightforward application of the identiﬁcation method
of Lanne and Lu¨tkepohl to the KW model. The uniqueness of the coeﬃcient matrix B˜ in
equation (2.20) depends on the chosen, or assumed, order of the elements {ψ1, . . . , ψn} on the
main diagonal of the matrix Ψ. Hence, without any a prior information on the correct these
elements, we have in total n! possible B-matrices.
This can be seen in the following way. As it is formally shown in the appendix of this chapter
(page 42), when equation (2.20) holds, we can equally well choose as our B-matrix the following
matrix Bˆ:
Bˆ = (WP′)(γIn + (1− γ)PΨP′)1/2
= WˆΨˆ
1/2
.
Above P is an arbitrary n × n permutation matrix, Wˆ = WP′, and Ψˆ = γIn + (1− γ)PΨP′.
The matrix PΨP′ is diagonal with a diﬀerent permutation of the elements {ψ1, . . . , ψn} on its
main diagonal than the matrix Ψ. The matrix Wˆ is simply a column-wise permutation of W.
Clearly B˜ in equation (2.20) is not equivalent to the matrix Bˆ unlessP = In. The permutation
matrix P was arbitrary and there are n! possible permutations. This means that there are equally
many matrices Bˆ (the matrix B˜ in equation (2.20) included, corresponding to P = In). The
15For details about deriving a conditional density for a VAR model with lagged values of the dependent variable,
see Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010).
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implication is that the B-matrix of the structural model is unique up to the permutation of the
elements {ψ1, . . . , ψn}; any permutation of these elements corresponds to only one permutation
matrix P.16
Lanne et al. (2010) note the sensitivity of the estimated matrix B˜ to diﬀerent permutations
of the main diagonal elements of Ψ (this is also discussed in Herwartz & Lu¨tkepohl (2011), and
Lu¨tkepohl (2012)). Hence, they propose to use either the order of the elements ψi from the
smallest to the largest, or from the largest to the smallest. However, nothing guarantees that
either of these two permutations would identify the correct permutation of the KW model. Here,
an alternative approach to identify the correct B-matrix is proposed.
2.3.2 Full Identiﬁcation of the Model
Recall the identity in equation (2.16) between the reduced form error vector ut (stock market
price changes) and the structural shocks vector ηt (news). Given any permutation of the elements
{ψ1, . . . , ψn}, the Lanne and Lu¨tkepohl identiﬁcation method guarantees a locally unique matrix
B˜. Assume this matrix is also invertible. Then, by premultiplying the equation (2.16) with B˜−1,
we get
ηt = B˜
−1ut.
So, the news are now written as a function of the stock market returns. Then, we are able to
calculate the covariance matrix of the news (Ση) as a function of (the estimated) matrix B˜ and
the covariance matrix of market volatilities Σu:
Ση = B˜
−1Σu(B˜′)−1. (2.21)
In the KW model the news covariance matrix Ση is a diagonal but not necessarily an identity
matrix. So, the equation above is not a trivial identity but estimates the variances of the
countries’ news variables (σ2
η(i)
) as a function of the reduced form errors’ covariance matrix and
the estimated matrix B˜ which in turn depends on the chosen order of the diagonal elements of
Ψ. In particular, we get that the ranking order for the variances {σ2
η(1)
, . . . , σ2
η(n)
} depends on
the speciﬁc matrix Ψ that we have used.
Hence, if we could ﬁnd–from exogenous sources–some proximate variable for countries’ news,
we would be able to get an alternative estimate for their variances. Especially, we are interested
16This can be seen in the following way: assume we have some given permutation of the elements {ψ1, . . . , ψn}
on the main diagonal of the matrix Ψ∗ so that it is a result of the matrix multiplication PΨP′, where Ψ =
diag (ψ1, . . . , ψn) and P is an arbitrary permutation matrix. Because the matrices Ψ and P are nonsingular,
Ψ∗ = PΨP′ is a bijection. So, whenever we ﬁx the order of the main diagonal elements of Ψ∗, we ﬁx the
permutation P, and vice versa.
28
in the countries’ ranking based on these variances of the proximate news variables. If the coun-
tries’ order based on the ranking is unambiguous (unique) in such a way that no two or more
countries share same ranking, we can use this ranking and equation (2.21) to identify the correct
permutation of our model. We simply select among our n! possible B-matrices the one that pro-
duces the same ranking of the countries based on their news’ variances as does our alternative
news variable. In our empirical application, data from the Google trends is used to calculate a
proximate news variable.
As a last note, an attentive reader might have noticed that in the beginning of this section
2.3 we assumed Ση = In whereas here Ση is diagonal but not necessarily an identity matrix.
There is no contradiction here because these are only two alternative ways to normalize a SVAR
model. First, when we use the Lanne-Lu¨tkepohl method to identify the matrix B˜, we use the
ﬁrst normalization. Once we have identiﬁed the correct permutation of the B-matrix (notice that
the countries’ order based on ranking does not depend on the chosen normalization), we need to
swap to the normalization that was assumed in the KW model, namely allow the values of the
diagonal elements of Ση vary freely but restrict the main diagonal elements of the matrix B˜ to
one. As shown in the appendix (page 44), this swap from the ﬁrst normalization to the latter
can be easily done: on each column k = 1, . . . , n of matrix B˜ provided by equation (2.20), divide
all the elements [B˜]ik, i = 1, . . . , n, by the main diagonal element [B˜]kk of the column.
2.3.3 Testing the Volatility Spillovers
Once we have estimated the KW model’s volatility spillover parameters βij for all i = j, we can
test these spillovers across the countries. As suggested in section 2.2.2, we should test for the
existence of volatility spillovers from country j to country i by comparing the unrestricted model
where βij = 0 against the restricted model where βij = 0. As the model is estimated with the
method of ML, the likelihood ratio (LR) test is a natural candidate for the test statistic. Given
that the underlying stochastic process is assumed to be stationary, we can use the standard
asymptotic distribution results of the ML estimation methodology.
Any restriction βij = 0 can be implemented by restricting to zero the corresponding element
of the matrix W, that is by imposing the restriction wij = 0. This can easily be seen by
considering equation (2.20), where the part (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)1/2 is diagonal by construction
with all the main diagonal elements γ + (1− γ)ψi being strictly positive. Because the coeﬃcient
of volatility spillover from country j to country i is
βij = [B˜]ij = wij (γ + (1− γ)ψi)1/2 ,
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it is clear that
βij = 0 ⇐⇒ wij = 0.
This same reasoning applies to any possible permutation of the estimated B-matrix
Bˆ = WˆΨˆ
1/2
that were considered earlier. The matrix Ψˆ is always diagonal with strictly positive main diagonal
elements. Hence, we only need to consider restrictions on the elements of the matrix Wˆ.
2.4 Empirical Application: The Eurozone Stock Markets
2010–2011
As an example of how to estimate and test the volatility transmission parameters of the KW
model, we consider the European stock markets. Since early 2010–or late 2009–the eurozone
has been in the middle of a sovereign debt crisis. The countries we include into our sample
are Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. Figure 2.1 shows how the equity price indexes
changed in these countries during our sample period, the years 2010–2011 (indexes have been
rescaled; for details about the data, see the appendix (page 45)). During this period, the stock
market prices decreased by almost 80 percent in Greece, in Spain and Italy by around 30 percent,
and by less than ten percent in Germany and Ireland.
2.4.1 Data: Daily Stock Market Returns
The data we will use represents the countries’ daily stock market returns. Consistent to the KW
model, the daily returns are approximated by the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the logarithmic transforma-
tions of the closing values of the price indexes:
ΔSit = logP
i
C,t − logP iC,t−1,
where P iC,t denotes the closing value of the price index in country i at date t, and i ∈ {ITA, SPA,
IRE,GRE,GER} (for shortenings, see table 2.1).
During the sample period, there were 517 business days. So, this gives us 516 observations of
the daily returns per country. However, for reasons of national banking holidays, each country
has missing values (for details, see the appendix (page 45)). I have substituted any missing value
with the previous available observation. Table 2.1 summarizes the data. Clearly, the empirical
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Figure 2.1: Stock market price indexes (Jan 4, 2010–Dec 30, 2011), daily closing values
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Daily stock market returns
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
Italy (ITA) -0.00 0.02 -0.06 5.94
Spain (SPA) -0.00 0.02 0.57 9.55
Ireland (IRE) -0.00 0.01 -0.14 5.23
Greece (GRE) -0.00 0.03 0.71 6.52
Germany (GER) -0.00 0.02 -0.15 5.12
Source: Yahoo! Finance, own calculations.
distributions of the returns are not normal. This supports the idea of using a non-normal error
distribution in our VAR model (see equation (2.18)).
2.4.2 Estimation of the KW Model
In order to identify the sources of spillovers for each particular country, we need to fully identify
the KW model. To do this, section 2.3.2 suggests that we use some available (exogenous) news
variable, call it χit for country i. Then, for each country i, we can use the variance of this
outside-the-model news variable (σ2χi) as a proxy for the variance of the KW model’s structural
shock (σ2ηi). Whenever the countries’ ranking order according to the variances of the alternative
news variables is unambiguous, in order to identify the KW model, we look after the permutation
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of the model that sets the estimated structural shock variances into the same ordering.
As an example, assume that the variances of the alternative news variables are ordered in
the following way: σ2χ2 > σ
2
χ3 > σ
2
χ1 > σ
2
χ4 > σ
2
χ5 . Then we try to ﬁnd the permutation of the
structural model that sets the countries’ (estimated) structural shock variances into the same
order, namely into the order σ2η2 > σ
2
η3 > σ
2
η1 > σ
2
η4 > σ
2
η5 .As it is shown in equation (2.21), the
selection of the correct permutation of the structural shock boils down to selecting the correct
B-matrix. There are ﬁve countries in the sample. This means there are 120 possible B-matrices.
The unrestricted model: Estimated spillover eﬀects
The data that we use as a proxy for news is the changes in the global search volumes in Google on
the economic conditions of our sample countries (ﬁgure 2.2). The data covers weekly observations
on the search traﬃc about each country between 2010 and 2011. (More details on the Google
Trends data are provided in the appendix, page 45.) For example, in one week of spring 2010,
internet searches on the Greek economy increased around 200 percentages from the previous week.
It would make sense to assume that such a heavy increase in the search traﬃc concerning the
Greek economy reﬂects new information available to the markets about the country’s economic
performance.17
Our identiﬁcation will then be based in the countries’ descending ranking order according to
the variances of the changes in the Google searches. Table 2.2 reports these variances and the
countries’ subsequent ranking order. The changes in the Google traﬃc on Italy has the largest
variance. Next comes Greece, then Spain, Ireland, and ﬁnally Germany. It must be said that the
chances in Google searches are not perfect proxies for our structural shocks because the changes
in search volumes are not uncorrelated to each other as they (ideally) should be. The sample
correlation coeﬃcients between the countries series range from 0.1 between Italy and Greece
to 0.4 between Spain and Greece. As the next paragraph discusses this correlation between
the weekly changes in the Google searches causes some problems for our model identiﬁcation.
Section 2.4.3 will discuss little further the strengths and weaknesses of the Google search data
and considers an alternative variable.
There are only two permutations of the (estimated) KW model–among the possible 120
models–that create the same ranking of the countries according to the estimated variances of the
countries’ structural shocks as in table 2.2. The reason that we are not able to identify one single
permutation probably lies in the fact that the changes in Google searches are not uncorrelated to
17Of course, the peak coincides with the onset of the euro debt crisis and the ﬁrst Greek bailout package, but
even so, this does not contradict with what is said in the text.
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Figure 2.2: Weekly percentage changes in Google search volume indexes and stock exchange
trading volumes
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Table 2.2: Variances of changes in Google search volumes
Country Variance Rank
Italy 3833.0 1
Greece 1842.0 2
Spain 1183.0 3
Ireland 367.0 4
Germany 339.0 5
Source: Google Trends, own calculations.
Table 2.3: Parameter estimates of the KW model (estimated standard errors in parentheses)
Elements of each vector
1 2 3 4 5
W[1, ·]× 100 0.81
∗∗∗ −0.11 0.06 0.10 −0.67
(0.29) (0.29) (0.23) (0.19) (0.38)
W[2, ·]× 100 0.62 0.34 0.02 0.31 −0.77
∗∗
(0.32) (0.30) (0.57) (0.18) (0.30)
W[3, ·]× 100 0.56
∗∗∗ 0.31 0.29 −0.50 −0.41
(0.18) (0.22) (0.85) (0.51) (0.28)
W[4, ·]× 100 0.64
∗∗∗ 0.25 1.71 0.76 −0.24
(0.19) (0.49) (1.28) (2.97) (0.37)
W[5, ·]× 100 0.80
∗∗∗ 0.22 −0.06 0.05 −0.19
(0.10) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.37)
Ψ
7.29∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 5.64∗∗∗
(1.19) (0.60) (0.39) (0.42) (0.87)
γ
0.63∗∗∗
(0.04)
Note: Standard errors obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-likelihood
function. W[i, ·] indicates ith row of matrix W. (∗∗) / (∗∗∗) means statistical
signiﬁcance at 5%/1% level. Estimated elements of W are multiplied by 100 for
reporting purposes. Log-likelihood function gets value 7964.44.
each other. However, these two alternative models give quite diﬀerent results, something that we
can use to select the most plausible model between our two candidates. Especially, when it comes
to the eﬀects of the German news on the other countries’ stock markets, according to one of the
two identiﬁed permutations a negative shock to German stock prices would increase the prices
in some countries whereas according to the other permutation a negative shock to German stock
prices always decreases prices in the other countries. Given that Germany is the core country of
the eurozone and it is also its safety haven, it seems to me that this last permutation is the most
plausible one. Table 2.3 reports the estimation results of this model.18
The ﬁrst ﬁve rows in table 2.3 correspond to the ﬁve rows of the matrix W (for reporting
purposes, the parameter estimates and their estimated standard errors are multiplied by 100).
The sixth row reports the estimated main diagonal elements of the matrix Ψ. Notice that the
18All calculations were done with the programs in the GAUSS CMLMT library.
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estimated matrices W and Ψ do not have any particular interpretation alone but they are used
to calculate the (identiﬁed) B-matrix. The last row of table 2.3 reports the estimated mixture
probability γ. Hence, with a probability of around 63.0 percent the reduced form error vector ut
is from the multi-normal distribution with smaller variances (the estimated covariance matrices
Σ1 and Σ1 are not reported here, but it is the Σ1 that corresponds to the ”regime” with less
volatility).
It is easier to interpret the results of table 2.3 once we have calculated the corresponding
B-matrix. By using the formula in equation (2.20), we get the following B-matrix19:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ΔSITAt
ΔSSPAt
ΔSIREt
ΔSGREt
ΔSGERt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1.00 −0.32 0.22 0.13 3.58
0.76 1.00 0.06 0.41 4.08
0.69 0.89 1.00 −0.66 2.18
0.79 0.74 5.96 1.00 1.26
0.98 0.63 −0.20 0.06 1.00
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ηITAt
ηSPAt
ηIREt
ηGREt
ηGERt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (2.22)
Equation above corresponds to the KW model’s structural equation (2.16) where the oﬀ-diagonal
elements βij , i = j, are the spillover coeﬃcients. First, observe that, as one would assume,
news in Germany and Italy has the greatest impact on the other countries. Positive news in
these two countries increases, ceteris paribus, stock market valuations also elsewhere. These two
are large eurozone countries, so their stock market performance probably both represents and
aﬀects international investors’ overall conﬁdence. Positive news in these countries increases this
conﬁdence and, so, support investments in equities across the whole currency zone. However, for
example, during the sample period, the eﬀect of the German news on Italy is over three times
greater (β15 = 3.58) than the eﬀect of the Italian news on Germany (β51 = 0.98). It is also
interesting that, in absolute terms, the eﬀect of German news on Italy and Spain were roughly
twice as big as on the two smaller countries. This probably reﬂects the importance of Italy and
Spain on the future course of the eurozone and, also, Germany’s role as both the most important
member country and the largest creditor which means it might have the last word when the
eurozone tries to navigate itself out of the crisis.
Second, the news in Ireland (Greece) aﬀect valuations in Greece (Ireland). In absolute value,
the eﬀect of Irish news on the Greece stock market valuations gets the largest value (β43 = 5.96)
over all of the estimated coeﬃcients. According to this result the news concerning Ireland caused
19Notice that the structural model has been renormalized to correspond the KW model. For details, see the
end of section 2.3.2, or the appendix.
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much more uncertainty (higher stock market volatility) in Greece than the opposite way. Also,
the eﬀects between these two countries are not symmetric: positive news in Greece decreases
prices in Ireland whereas the positive news in Ireland increases prices also in Greece. This result
might be a particularity of the sample period and/or reﬂect two things: ﬁrst, being two small,
peripheral countries of the eurozone, Greece and Ireland might traditionally be each others
substitutes in international investors’ portfolios–if stocks in both countries were equally safe,
investors would choose the country with lower prices. Hence, the news in these countries would
also aﬀect the other via the substitution eﬀect. Second, however, during the sample period,
Ireland was possibly considered as more safe a country for investments than Greece. If then
there was good news in Greece, all other things equal, investing in Greece might have seem less
risky and, also, at the same time more compelling given the low price levels compared to those
in Ireland.
As a third observation from the estimated eﬀects in equation (2.22), notice that, as one would
assume, on average the eﬀects of small countries’ news on the large countries’ stock markets are
quite small whereas the news in the large countries have relatively large eﬀects on the valuations in
the small countries. This said, to summarize the results, although the estimated eﬀects probably
to some extend reﬂect peculiarities of the sample period, they feel quite intuitive. Overall, there
seem to be relatively large volatility spillover eﬀects across the countries, but the eﬀects are
necessarily not symmetric.
The restricted model: Testing spillovers
Table 2.3 suggests that we might be able to restrict to zero some of the elements of W. This
will also constitute our volatility testing as βij = 0 iﬀ wij = 0 for all i = j (see section 2.3.3).
The fact that we know we are now working with the identiﬁed KW model means that the within
country eﬀects of each country’s structural shocks (the main diagonal elements of theW matrix)
must be non-zero.
Our ﬁrst test is to see if there were any volatility spillovers between the countries at all. This
means to test whether the matrix B˜ is diagonal or not. If it is, then there were not any spillovers
during our sample period. The null-hypothesis of no spillover eﬀects is rejected with the LR test.
The test statistic comparing the restricted model to the unrestricted gets the value 1846.2 which
is clearly greater than the critical values of the χ2-distribution at any reasonable signiﬁcance
level with 20 degrees of freedom (all the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the matrix W).
Next, we will proceed stepwise by ﬁrst restricting to zero that oﬀ-diagonal element wij , i = j,
which has the largest p-value and test with the LR-test whether or not the restriction is rejected
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Table 2.4: Estimation results of the restricted KW model (estimated standard errors in paren-
theses)
Elements of each vector
1 2 3 4 5
W[1, ·]× 100 0.80
∗∗∗ ·· ·· 0.06 −0.69∗∗
(0.27) (0.11) (0.35)
W[2, ·]× 100 0.61
∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ ·· 0.29∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.06) (0.10) (0.27)
W[3, ·]× 100 0.54
∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.38
(0.16) (0.12) (0.18) (0.15) (0.24)
W[4, ·]× 100 0.67
∗∗∗ ·· 1.47∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗ −0.26
(0.16) (0.36) (0.51) (0.35)
W[5, ·]× 100 0.78
∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ −0.03 ·· −0.17
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.34)
Ψ
7.36∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 2.58∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 5.59∗∗∗
(1.20) (0.61) (0.39) (0.42) (0.87)
γ
0.63∗∗∗
(0.04)
Note: Standard errors obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-likelihood
function. W[i, ·] indicates ith row of matrix W. (∗∗) / (∗∗∗) means statistical
signiﬁcance at 5%/1% level. Estimated elements of W are multiplied by 100
for reporting purposes. Log-likelihood function gets value 7964.00.
at the 5% signiﬁcant level. If it is not, in the second step, we will restrict to zero the oﬀ-diagonal
element of W that now has the largest p-value. We should continue this process until no-more
zero restrictions on the oﬀ-diagonal elements wij , i = j, are supported by the data at the 5%
signiﬁcant level. This process leads us to the restricted model of table 2.4. There are ﬁve
restricted wij elements. The LR-test statistic jointly testing these restrictions gets value 0.89
which is below 11.1, the critical value of the χ2-distribution with ﬁve degrees of freedom and at
the 5% signiﬁcance level.
The next element of the W with the largest p-value is the element w53. However, when we
restrict this element to zero we loose our identiﬁcation; the countries’ structural shock variances
are not anymore ordered as in table 2.2. This means that we would again need to identify
from the possible 120 permutations the one which gives the correct ranking of the countries and
incorporates all the already imposed zero restrictions. Unfortunately this is not an easy task
because in each permutation the indexes of the already restricted elements change, making the
process quite intractable. Hence, I feel that the marginal beneﬁt, compared to the costs, of extra
restrictions would be quite minimal, especially as the most evident restrictions have already been
imposed.
It is, again, easiest, to interpret the estimation results in table 2.4 once we have calculated
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the corresponding (restricted model) B-matrix which is the following:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ΔSITAt
ΔSESPt
ΔSIREt
ΔSGREt
ΔSGERt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1.00 ·· ·· 0.05 4.08
0.76 1.00 ·· 0.25 4.34
0.67 0.70 1.00 −0.37 2.27
0.83 ·· 3.26 1.00 1.53
0.97 0.60 −0.07 ·· 1.00
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ηITAt
ηESPt
ηIREt
ηGREt
ηGERt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (2.23)
So, during the sample period, there were not statistically signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects from
Ireland to Italy and Spain; from Spain to Italy and Greece; and from Greece to Germany. Also,
the absolute values of the coeﬃcients of Irish news on Germany (β53 = −0.07) and Greek news on
Italy (β14 = 0.05) are relatively small. When interpreting these results, it is good to recall from
section 2.2.2 that any spillover coeﬃcient βij is zero iﬀ the investors do not consider the country
j news being relevant for the market valuations in country i. Hence, again not surprisingly, we
could roughly say that, except for the eﬀects from Greece to Spain, the news in our sample’s
small countries (Greece and Ireland) were nor considered very relevant for the stock market
prices in the large countries (Germany, Italy, and Spain) whereas the stock market prices in the
small countries were susceptible to news in the large countries, again the eﬀect of Spanish news
on Greece is an exception.
Given that Spain is a large member country of the eurozone, it is perhaps surprising that
we ﬁnd the importance of news concerning Spain to have relatively low importance. However,
it should be remembered that our sample period consists of the beginning of the euro crisis.
Especially in the beginning of the crisis much of the media’s attention focused on the public
ﬁnances of Greece, Ireland, and Italy, and less so on the Spanish public debt. This seems natural
when we note that in 2010–2011 the public debt in Spain was still at a reasonable level. Table
2.5 reports both the countries’ government debt levels (as percentage of GDP) and their yearly
percentage changes for the years 2008–2010. Clearly the Greek and Italian governments were
heavily indebted already before the euro crisis, and, in addition, the Greek public debt level
increased by around 14–15 percent per annum in 2009–2011. Ireland started with low levels of
public debt but, due to high yearly growth rates, the Irish public debt was already over 100
percent of GDP in 2011. Spain, in contrast, had still in 2011 a lower public debt level than
Germany.
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Table 2.5: Government debt 2008–2011: levels (percentage of GDP) and yearly percentage
changes
2008 2009 2010 2011
level chg level chg level chg level chg
Greece 112.9 5.1 129.7 14.9 148.3 14.3 170.6 15.0
Italy 106.1 2.7 116.4 9.7 119.2 2.4 120.7 1.3
Germany 66.8 2.5 74.5 11.5 82.5 10.7 80.5 -2.4
Ireland 44.5 77.3 64.9 45.8 92.2 42.1 106.4 15.4
Spain 40.2 10.7 53.9 34.1 61.5 14.1 69.3 12.7
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
2.4.3 Model Diagnostic and Discussion
Because our model assumes the mixed-normal distribution, conventional residuals are not avail-
able for model diagnostics. For a univariate model with a distribution like ours, Kalliovirta
(2012) proposes to use quantile residuals. According to Kalliovirta, two transformations deﬁne
quantile residuals: ﬁrst, one transforms observations into approximately independent uniformly
distributed random variables by using the estimated cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the model. Second, by using the inverse of the CDF of the standard normal distribution, one
transforms the uniformly distributed variables into random variables that are approximately in-
dependent and follow the standard normal distribution. These results assume that the model is
correctly speciﬁed. Hence, we can study the validity of the model by inspecting the properties
of the quantile residuals.
Kalliovirta & Saikkonen (2010) propose a generalization of quantile residuals for multivariate
models and, similalry to the univariate case, develop tests for normality, autocorrelation and
conditional heteroskedasticity of the quantile residuals. Again, the same two transformations of
the observations as in the univariate case deﬁne the multivariate quantile residuals. However,
as we are dealing with a n × 1 residual vector, in transforming the observations into uniformly
distributed random variables, we need to use the CDFs of each county’s marginal distribution
at period t, conditional on the countries’ order and the other countries’ observations at period
t. Kalliovirta and Saikkonen deﬁne univariate joint quantile residuals Qt that, at each period t,
incorporate into a single variable the n×1 vector of quantile residuals20. If our model is correctly
speciﬁed, the joint quantile residuals are independently distributed, homoskedastic, and follow
the standard normal distribution. Hence, any great deviation from these characteristics should
be considered as a case against the validity of our model.
Figure 2.3 plots the QQ-plot of the joint quantile residuals holds. Except for a few outliers
20For further details on joint quantile residuals, see Kalliovirta & Saikkonen (2010).
39
Figure 2.3: Joint quantile residuals, QQ-plot
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at both tails, the normality assumption seems to hold quite well. When formally testing the
normality of the quantile residual, as suggested by Kalliovirta and Saikkonen, we get the p-value
of 0.70. Hence, normality seems to hold. As our data consists of daily observations, I consider
lags from one to ﬁve in the autocorrelation and conditional heteroskedasticity testing. For the
autocorrelation test, the p-values range from 0.01 (one lag) to 0.06 (four lags). Hence, there
is some evidence of remaining autocorrelation in the quantile residuals. For the conditional
heteroskedasticity test, the p-values range from 0.12 (ﬁve lags) to 0.65 (four lags). Hence, there
does not seem to be much conditional heteroskedasticity in the quantile residuals. Overall it
seems that the diagnostic tests support our model quite well.
Finally, as it was mentioned in section 2.4.2, the Google search data is not a perfect proxy for
the KW model’s news variables because the changes in the countries’ search data are correlated
to each other. However, compared to some other alternatives, the Google data fares quite well.
For example, changes in the trading volumes in the countries’ stock markets is an alternative
proxy for country speciﬁc news. The dashed lines in ﬁgure 2.2 depict the weekly changes in
the average weekly trading volume for our sample countries. Overall the changes in the Google
searches and the trading volume seem to be quite well related to each other. However, for Ireland
the changes in trading volume are more volatile than the changes in the Google searches, and
the opposite is true for Italy. This suggests that using the changes in trading volumes as proxies
for our news variables might lead to diﬀerent results than the ones reported in this paper.
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The main reason for using the changes in the Google searches, instead of the changes in
trading volumes, as a variable for identiﬁcation is that the countries’ Google series are less
correlated to each other than the changes in the trading volumes. The correlation coeﬃcients of
the latter range from 0.2 to 0.5 which is slightly higher than the range for the changes in the
Google series. Moreover, it should be added that, for example, Choi & Varian (2012) show that
using the Google Trends data improves the ”nowcasting” performance of the standard forecasting
models.
2.5 Conclusions and Discussion
The aim of this paper was to combine a theoretical explanation for volatility spillovers with a
statistical model in order to develop a spillover test that would be well founded on economic
theory. The selected approach was to augment the King & Wadhwani (1990) rational expecta-
tions model with an distributional assumption about the reduced form error distribution. This
allowed us to identify the model and estimate it with the method of maximum likelihood. We
were then able to test for the volatility spillovers with the likelihood ratio test. The whole model
framework is designed for studying volatility spillovers in fully overlapping stock markets.
In the empirical application, the model was estimated using the eurozone stock market data
in the years 2010–2011, the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. Evidence of volatility spillovers
was found. The large countries in the sample (Italy and Germany in particular) have large eﬀects
on all countries, both large and small. The small countries (Ireland and Greece) mostly have
eﬀects on each other. The results probably somewhat reﬂect the particularities of the sample
period, but overall the results were quite intuitive. Generally speaking, the model diagnostics
gave quite good support for our model.
Some possible extensions of the model are, ﬁrst, to allow the structural shocks to have
GARCH-eﬀects. Second, contemplating only partially overlapping markets (with only a few
common opening hours) might be fruitful as then one could set some zero restrictions on the
instantaneous linkages between the markets.
Let us ﬁnally spend a few moments in discussing the possible implications of our empirical
results. For investors, the main message of our empirical exercise is that there might be large
volatility spillovers between countries and, also, that these spillover eﬀects can be quite asym-
metric. Obviously, this aﬀects how an investor should allocate his assets and to her perception of
risk. Whenever there is a core country whose volatility gets easily transmitted to other countries,
it is of course quite hard for an investor to try to control and minimize her risk exposure to the
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idiosyncratic shocks of this country by diversifying her assets.
The task of asset allocation is made even harder by the fact that, according to our theoretical
model, volatility spillovers are due to information asymmetries between investors. In the theoret-
ical model that this paper considered, the relative shares of informed and uninformed investors
were assumed given. However, relating to the discussion in section 2.2.5, Kodres and Pritsker
show that as the relative share of the uninformed investors grow, the spillover eﬀects might be-
come greater than before. In the case of the European debt crisis, it seems plausible to think
that in the onset of the crisis with a lot of uncertainty about, for example, the public ﬁnances of
Greece, Italy, Ireland, and later Spain, the number of bewildered investors grew and, hence, the
informations asymmetries and spillover eﬀects augmented. If at the same time some countries,
for example, restrict or ban short-selling of stocks, this could reduce investors incentives to stay
informed on the countries’ fundamentals, as is suggested by the analysis of Calvo and Mendoza
that was also referred to in section 2.2.5. Hence, as the result of short-selling restrictions, the
relative share of uninformed investors could increase further, making the spillover eﬀects even
greater during a crisis.
Appendix
Note on Lanne and Lu¨tkepohl Identiﬁcation Method
This appendix shows why the identiﬁcation method of Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010) provides only
a partial estimation of the coeﬃcient matrix B˜. Assume the following n × n matrices: Ψ =
diag (ψ1, . . . , ψn) with ψi > 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n; and W. Assume also a mixture probability γ
such that 0 < γ < 1. Also, assume the n× n reduced form error vector’s covariance matrix Ση˜
can be written as
Ση˜ =W (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)W′ =WΨ¯W′, (2.24)
where In is the n × n identity matrix, and Ψ¯ = γIn + (1− γ)Ψ. Clearly Ψ¯ is also a diagonal
matrix with its ith main diagonal element being ψ¯i = γ + (1− γ)ψi. Hence, there is a bijective
mapping between Ψ¯ and Ψ. So, we can concentrate on the diﬀerent permutations of Ψ¯.
Now, take an arbitrary n×n permutation matrix P such that P = In. Because permutation
matrices are orthogonal matrices, it holds that P′P = In, where P′ denotes the transpose of P.
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Hence, we can write
Ση˜ = (WP
′)
(
PΨ¯P′
)
(WP′)′
= WˆΨˆWˆ′, (2.25)
where we have redeﬁned Wˆ =WP′ and Ψˆ = PΨ¯P′.
It is straightforward to see that the matrix Ψˆ is diagonal with a diﬀerent permutation of
elements {ψ1, . . . , ψn} on its main diagonal than the matrix Ψ¯. First, write
Ψˆ = P(Ψ¯
1/2
Ψ¯
1/2
)P′ = (PΨ¯1/2)(PΨ¯′
1/2
)′ = (PΨ¯1/2)(PΨ¯1/2)′,
which is possible because ψ¯i > 0 for all i. Mark as ek the 1×n vector whose kth element equals
one and all the other elements equal zero. Then the jth column of Ψ¯
1/2
can be written as e′jψ¯
1/2
j .
Now, consider the permutation
Π : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}, Π(k) = πk ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
that corresponds to the permutation matrix P. Then the ith row of P is eπi . And so, the ijth
element of matrix PΨ¯
1/2
is [
PΨ¯
1/2
]
ij
= eπie
′
jψ¯
1/2
j
that equals zero whenever πi = j and ψ¯1/2πi when πi = j. The ijth element of matrix (PΨ¯1/2)′
equals to the the jith element of matrix PΨ¯
1/2
. Hence,
[
Ψˆ
]
ij
=
[
(PΨ¯
1/2
)(PΨ¯
1/2
)′
]
ij
=
n∑
k=1
(
eπie
′
kψ¯
1/2
k
)(
eπje
′
kψ¯
1/2
k
)
=
n∑
k=1
ψ¯keπie
′
keπje
′
k
which equals zero whenever i = j and ψ¯πi when i = j. Hence, the matrix Ψˆ is diagonal and the
order of its main diagonal elements corresponds to the permutation Π.
So, based on equations (2.24) and (2.25) we have now two equally possible choices for matrix
B˜ (see equation (2.20)):
B˜(1) =WΨ¯
1/2
or B˜(2) = WˆΨˆ
1/2
.
These two alternative B˜ matrices are not the same as long as P = In. Because there are n!
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diﬀerent matrices P, there will also be n! alternative matrices B˜. Hence, unless we know exactly
which of the permutation matrices P to use, the structural model parameters will not be fully
identiﬁed.
Swapping between Alternative SVAR Normalizations
The notation in this appendix is independent of the one used in the main text. Assume a n× 1
reduced from error vector ut of a VAR model and a n × 1 vector of the structural shocks εt of
a SVAR model. The reduced from error vector is assumed to be linear transformation of the
structural shocks vector; ut = Bεt. The structural shocks are distributed as εt ∼ (0,Σε) where
Σε is a diagonal matrix. The reduced form errors are distributed as ut ∼ (0,Σu) where Σu is a
general n× n covariance matrix. Consider then the two following options to normalize a SVAR
model:
(1) Assume Σε = In and let the elements of B vary freely, or
(2) Assume diag(B) = 1n×1 and let the (diagonal) elements of Σε vary freely,
where 1n×1 refers to the n× 1 vector with all elements equal to one.
The ﬁrst normalization assumption is used in the paper by Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010) and the
second in the original King and Wadhwani model. From this papers point of view, the relevant
question is: How to switch from the normalization (1) to (2)?
First, assume normalization (1). For notational simplicity, let us suppress the time indexes.
Then, we have the n × 1 random vectors ε and u, and the n × n matrices Σε and B, where
Σε = In. Following the identity u = Bε, we have
Σu = E(uu
′) = BE(εε′)B′ = BΣεB′ = BB′, (2.26)
where E() is the expectations operator.
Secondly, assume normalization (2). Then, we have the n× 1 random vectors ε˜ and u, where
ε˜ is not necessarily equal to ε, the structural shocks of the previous paragraph. Also, we have
the n× n matrices Σε˜ and B˜, where diag(B˜) = 1n×1. Again, following the identity u = B˜ε˜, we
also have
Σu = E(uu
′) = B˜Σε˜B˜′ =
(
B˜Σ
1
2
ε˜
)(
B˜Σ
1
2
ε˜
)′
. (2.27)
Form equations (2.26) and (2.27) we get an identity
B = B˜Σ
1
2
ε˜ . (2.28)
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For simplicity, let us limit our discussion to the two variable case (n = 2). Thus, we have
B =
⎡
⎢⎣b11 b12
b21 b22
⎤
⎥⎦ , B˜ =
⎡
⎢⎣ 1 b˜12
b˜21 1
⎤
⎥⎦ , and Σ 12ε˜ =
⎡
⎢⎣σ˜1 0
0 σ˜2
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Equation (2.28) becomes ⎡
⎢⎣b11 b12
b21 b22
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣ σ˜1 σ˜2b˜12
σ˜1b˜21 σ˜2
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
which gives us following four equations between the parameters. By solving for b˜12 and b˜21, we
get ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b˜21 = b21/b11
b˜12 = b12/b22
.
Hence, we have derived that
B˜ =
⎡
⎢⎣ 1
b12
b22
b21
b11
1
⎤
⎥⎦ .
So, once we have an estimate of B that is based on normalization (1), we can change to normal-
ization (2) by dividing every column of B by the column’s main diagonal element. Clearly, the
result generalizes to all n ≥ 2.
Data Details
Stock market data
The upper part of table 2.6 provides the details of the stock market price indexes that are used
in this paper. All the stock market data is downloaded from Yahoo! Finance. In total the period
under consideration covers 517 trading days. Due to banking holidays, none of the individual
stock exchanges were open at every possible trading day. When there was a missing value, I
selected the closing value of the previous (open) trading day.
Google trends data
The Google Trends data provides observations on how diﬀerent topics (search terms) have been
searched (in English) over time and provides weekly observations of Google’s search volume
index. The search index reports the average amount of traﬃc (Google searches) on the chosen
topic relative to the worldwide search traﬃc (in Google) during the week. Given that the data is
only available for the searches in English, the generality of our results in the empirical application
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of the paper could, of course, be questioned. However, because we are actually interested in the
changes of the search volume data, as long as the data for the English tracks well the searches in
other languages, this shortcoming should not aﬀect too much our results. It is hard to imagine
that trends in particular searches done in English would considerably diﬀer (on average) from
searches done in other languages.
The lower part of the table below reports the details of both the search topics I was interested
to ﬁnd data on and the actual Google Trends keywords I used to ﬁnd the time series. So, for
example, (italy gdp) means that the keyword in question is Italy and (its) GDP. The bar sign
”|” between the keywords means that I wanted to ﬁnd data on the Google searches including at
least one of the keywords.
Table 2.6: Data details: Stock market indexes, and Google search volume index
Stock market price indexes, daily closing values for the period
Jan 4,2010–Dec 30, 2011
Country: Stocks Trading Missing
Index included days obs.
Italy: FTSE MIB 40 most traded 512 5
Spain: IBEX 35 35 most traded stocks 523 4
Germany: DAX 30 most traded 513 4
Ireland: ISEQ Overall Index All 514 3
Greece: FTSE/ASE 20 20 most traded 503 14
Topics and the speciﬁc keywords used in Google Trends
Search topic Actual keyword in Google Trends
Italian economy OR debt OR (italy gdp) | (italy debt) |
stock market (italy stock)
Spain economy OR debt OR (spain gdp) | (spain debt) |
stock market (spain stock)
German economy OR debt OR (germany gdp) | (germany debt) |
stock market (germany stock)
Irish economy OR debt (ireland gdp) | (ireland debt) |
stock market (ireland stock)
Greece economy OR debt OR (greece gdp) | (greece debt) |
stock market (greece stock)
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Chapter 3
Transmission of Government
Default Risk in the Eurozone
Abstract1
The paper analyzes the reasons behind the rising ten year government bond spreads
in the eurozone during the recent euro debt crisis. The structural vector autoregres-
sive model that is developed allows us to test whether the upsurges in the spreads re-
ﬂect breaks in the instantaneous shock propagation mechanisms between the spreads,
changing dynamical eﬀects, or changing country speciﬁc risk factors. Especially, we
develop a new approach to test the stability of the instantaneous shock propagation
mechanisms. Our results show that there are signiﬁcant increases in the country spe-
ciﬁc risk factors of Ireland, Spain and Italy, while for Greece and Portugal contagion
seems to be the main explanation.
1An old version of this chapter has appeared as HECER Discussion Paper No. 359 (2012).
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3.1 Introduction
The European debt crisis has been like a long-lasting drama, unfolding in many acts. Its be-
ginning can be traced to October-November 2009 when the Greek government revealed the dire
state of the country’s public ﬁnances (De Santis (forthcoming)). In the following years the crisis
advanced rapidly; Greece, Portugal and Ireland were bailed out by the consortium of the Euro-
pean Union (EU), European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund, Spain
was provided ﬁnancial guarantees, and the EU and ECB needed quickly to adopt for new rules
and institutions for ﬁnancial crisis management. Only in 2013 the crisis started slowly to calm
down, and, at the end of the year, Ireland became the ﬁrst country to exit the bailout program.
One of the primary scenes of the crisis has been the government bond markets where the
yields of the crisis countries rose quickly to levels last seen in the 1990’s when the countries still
had their national currencies (ﬁgure 3.1). This paper introduces a non-linear structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) model to analyze the ten year government bond spreads of the crisis
countries over Germany. The main motivation is to understand the sources of the increasing
spreads during 2010–2012, the most acute years of the crisis.
Reckoning the German bond risk-free, then, for the eurozone member countries their ten
year government bond spreads over the German bond basically measure the default risk of their
government debt (Favero & Missale (2012)). There are then many possible reasons for the higher
spreads during the crisis. Some have argued that the crisis simply reﬂects structural ﬂaws in the
architecture of the monetary union (De Grauwe & Ji (2013)), such as the slack enforcement of the
ﬁscal discipline clause of the monetary union and the uncertainty over the joint bailout of an ailing
government.2 Others see that the spreads rose during the crisis because the government default
risk was actually ”mispriced” prior to the crisis (Beirne & Fratzscher (2013)), or the feedback
loop between the governments and national banking sectors changed over the course of the crisis
(Mody & Sandri (2012)). But perhaps the most popular explanation has been contagion3 of
government credit risk between the countries (for example Missio & Watzka (2011), Mink & de
Haan (2013), Beetsma et al. (2013)). However, this explanation has recently been challenged;
for example Caporin et al. (2013) do not ﬁnd evidence of contagion in default risk between the
eurozone countries during the crisis, also Beirne & Fratzscher (2013) reach a roughly similar
conclusion4.
2Pisani-Ferry (2013) discusses some of the ﬂaws.
3Intuitively, contagion means that a ﬁnancial crisis in one country causes a crisis also in another country.
However, as footnote 5 explains, the empirical contagion literature uses a more speciﬁc deﬁnition. There are
several survey articles available on contagion: for example Dornbusch et al. (2000), Forbes & Rigobon (2001),
Pericoli & Sbracia (2003), and Forbes (2012).
4Beirne & Fratzscher (2013) refer transmission of credit risk between countries as regional contagion.
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Figure 3.1: Ten year government bond yields in Jan/1993–Sept/2013 (monthly data)
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Our model helps us to structure this discussion. In the model, there can be three types of
crisis-contingent structural breaks in the stochastic process of the spreads which we can all test
with statistical tests. First, the intercepts can change. Such a break can be interpreted as an
exogenous change in the idiosyncratic country risk, due to, for example, a foreseeable national
bailout of banking sector. Second, the autoregressive coeﬃcients can change, especially the
dynamic interdependencies between the countries. These dynamic interdependencies are called
spillovers (Dungey & Martin (2007)). Changing spillovers can make spreads more volatile and
could reﬂect bond markets becoming more speculative, for example due to lack of integrity in
the decision making of the monetary union and uncertainty over its institutions. Third, the
instantaneous (or contemporaneous) interdependencies between the countries can change due
to a ﬁnancial crisis. This means that a country speciﬁc shock would have a greater immediate
impact on the spreads of the other countries during the crisis than before. This third structural
break corresponds to contagion (Forbes & Rigobon (2002)).5 Compared to pre-crisis period,
5Forbes & Rigobon (2002) underline the need to distinguish contagion from (mere) interdependence which refers
to instantaneous linkages between ﬁnancial variables in tranquil times. Contagion is then a crisis-contingent
structural change in such linkages. The mainstream of the empirical research has adopted this deﬁnition of
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contagion would be visible as a break in the correlations between the models residuals during a
crisis.
We estimate the SVAR model with weekly data on ten year government bond spreads of the
main crisis countries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy). As Greece joined the eurozone
only in 2001, we consider the time period from January 2001 to December 2012. The analysis
shows that for each country the intercept increases during the crisis but that only for Ireland,
Spain and Italy the increase is statistically signiﬁcant. There are statistically signiﬁcant increases
in the spillovers during the crisis only for Greece and Portugal. When it comes to breaks in the
instantaneous linkages, there is evidence of contagion across all countries, but the contagious
eﬀects appear especially strong towards Greece and Portugal. So, all in all, although contagion
is clearly the single most important factor in explaining the higher spreads during the crisis,
for Ireland, Spain and Italy also the country speciﬁc risk factors appear to play their role. The
importance of spillovers appears small.
The main contribution of the paper is to introduce a new way to test for the stability of
the instantaneous linkages. Our approach is based on the idea of Favero & Giavazzi (2002) to
test for contagion in the government bond spreads with a SVAR model. They allow structural
breaks only in the instantaneous interdependencies and identify their model with restrictions on
spillovers. Also, their framework requires analysis of news in order to identify source countries of
exogenous shocks. In addition to that our model allows for several sources of breaks, it does not
require any identifying restrictions on parameters, nor do we need to analyze news. Rather, the
identiﬁcation is based on the ideas of Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2008, 2010) to use heteroskedasticity
and non-normalities in the error distribution as the necessarily extra source of information for
identiﬁcation.6
Our approach to test for the stability of instantaneous linkages is closest to the test of pa-
rameter stability in a multivariate setting proposed by Rigobon (2003b). His test is based on
the covariance matrices of market returns in normal and crisis times and computing the element-
wise changes in these covariances. If the determinant of the matrix that includes these changes
is zero, and assuming that we know that at least one country is not a source country of the crisis,
the instantaneous interdependencies between the variables would have stayed stable during the
crisis. However, Rigobon’s test is a joint test for the stability of all parameters of the model. Our
contagion, see for example Corsetti et al. (2005), Pesaran & Pick (2007), Billio & Caporin (2010), and Metiu
(2012), only to mention a few. Forbes & Rigobon (2001, 45–46) discuss the beneﬁts of this deﬁnition.
6Identiﬁcation of a SVAR model based on properties of data, contrary to parameter restrictions, has received
some attention in the recent literature. For example, Rigobon (2003a) considers a heteroskedasticity based
identiﬁcation plan that has been applied in the contagion and volatility spillover literature (Caporale et al.
(2005b,a), Rigobon (2002), Rigobon & Sack (2003)). Rigobon’s approach assumes heteroskedasticity in the
distribution of the structural shocks whereas our approach assumes that in the distribution of the reduced form
residuals which is closer to the assumptions of Favero and Givazzi.
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framework allows to test separately for the stability of intercepts, spillovers and instantaneous
interdependencies.
Also Dungey et al. (2005) and Pesaran & Pick (2007) consider testing of contagion in a
multivariate setting. The former proposes to test contagion in a latent factor model context.
But with more than three countries the model is unidentiﬁed without further restrictions. Our
approach is basically applicable for any number of countries. The latter article discusses of
several possible extensions of the Favero and Giavazzi model, including the idea of breaks in
the intercepts and spillovers. In order to identify turmoil periods, Pesaran & Pick (2007) set
predeﬁned threshold values for the residuals. The actual identiﬁcation is based on using country
speciﬁc regressors as instruments for the endogenous variables. In our context this would mean
using the past values of the spreads.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and
discusses the testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 estimates the model. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Model for government bond spreads
This section ﬁrst introduces the SVAR model. Then we talk about how to identify it and test
for the stability of the instantaneous linkages between the variables. The ﬁnal subsection shows
how to estimate the model.
3.2.1 The SVAR model
Denote the government bond yield of country i in period t as yit and that of the German
government bond as y∗t . The bond spread of country i over Germany in period t is deﬁned as
sit = yit−y∗t . Assume there are two distinct time periods: normal times (N ) and the crisis period
(C ). Also, suppose that there are n countries and collect their spreads into the (n× 1) vector st.
Furthermore, assume that st follows the subsequent non-linear ﬁrst order vector autoregressive
(VAR) model7:
st =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
μN +ANst−1 + ut, when t ∈ N,
μC +ACst−1 + ut, when t ∈ C,
(3.1)
where μN is the (n × 1) vector of the intercepts during the normal times, and μC during the
crisis period; similarly AN and AC are the (n×n) autoregressive coeﬃcient matrices during the
normal period and the crisis period, respectively; and ut is the (n× 1) reduced form error vector
7In our empirical analysis, the lag order of the VAR model is selected with the Bayesian information criterion.
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which we will assume to follow the mixture-normal distribution with mean zero and covariance
matrices ΣNu and Σ
C
u in the normal period and the crisis period, respectively.
Hence, in our model during a crisis period, there can be a structural break in the stochastic
process of the government spread of a country for three reasons (some intuition for these breaks
was discussed in the introduction). First, the intercept of a country may change. If, for example,
μi,C > μi,N , there is an exogenous increase in the level of the government default risk of country
i. Another possible reason for a break is a change in the dynamic interdependencies between
the spreads. Denote by a−i,N (a−i,C) the ith row of matrix AN (AC) excluding the ith element
aii,N (aii,C). The vector a−i,N (a−i,C) measures the joint dynamic eﬀect of the other countries
lagged values on sit during the normal (crisis) period while aii,N (aii,C) measures the eﬀect of
its own lag. Changes in the autoregressive coeﬃcients can make sit more volatile during the
crisis period if, for example, all the elements of a−i,C are in absolute value greater than the
corresponding elements in a−i,N . Finally, there is the possibility of a break in the instantaneous
interdependencies between the spreads.
As mentioned in the introduction, the empirical contagion literature is concerned about the
stability of the instantaneous interdependencies (or conditional correlations) between ﬁnancial
variables. From the practical point of view this means that, for example, all predictability of
stock market returns is ﬁrst ﬁltered away and the testing occurs in the residuals.8 The main
motivation for this comes from the ﬁeld of ﬁnance where the idea of the beneﬁts of international
diversiﬁcation of assets is based on the exploitation of the estimated conditional correlations
between the asset returns. If contagion causes these correlations to break during a crisis, the
diversiﬁcation may fail to provide the expected hedge at the moment such a hedge is usually the
most needed (for a more detailed discussion, see Forbes & Rigobon (2001, 45)).
In model (3.1) breaks in the instantaneous linkages identiﬁes as breaks in the interrelationships
between the elements of ut during a crisis. In order to formalize this idea, assume that there are
n country speciﬁc structural shocks ε1,t, . . . , εn,t which are assumed to be uncorrelated with each
other. This is a standard assumption in the SVAR literature (Lu¨tkepohl (2007)). Now, collect the
structural shocks into the (n×1) vector εt and assume that εt is linearly associated to the reduced
form errors ut in the following way: in normal times ut = BNεt, while in a crisis ut = BCεt.
As the matrices BN and BC depict the propagation of country speciﬁc shocks during normal
times and a crisis, respectively, they determine the instantaneous interdependencies between the
8For example, Forbes & Rigobon (2002) ﬁrst ﬁlter our all autocorrelation from stock market returns and then
focus on the residuals of the VAR model. Similarly, when discussing contagion, Bekaert et al. (2005) concentrate
on the residuals of their model once all predictability is ﬁltered out from market returns. Also, for example,
Pesaran & Pick (2007) and Chiang et al. (2007) concentrate on residuals of an autoregressive model.
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spreads in both periods. Hence, our objective is to test whether or not BN = BC . In case they
are, there is not evidence of contagion.
As it is explained in more detail in the next subsection, the testing of the stability of the
B-matrices is based on allowing heteroskedasticity in the distribution of ut. Given that crisis
periods are usually more volatile than normal times, this is a natural assumption. The main
point is the following: in the SVAR framework, it is usually assumed that the structural shocks
have a unit variance. This means that we have Σε = In, where In is the (n×n) identity matrix.
It then follows that we can write the covariance matrices of the reduced form errors during the
normal period and the crisis period as ΣNu = BNB
′
N and Σ
C
u = BCB
′
C , respectively. So, in
our model, the heteroskedasticity of the reduced form errors is a direct consequence of possible
breaks in the instantaneous shock propagation mechanisms.
Model (3.1) is an extension of the SVAR model of Favero & Giavazzi (2002). First of all,
they assume AN = AC and μN = μC . Furthermore, following our notation, we can write their
key assumptions as BN = F and BC = F(In +GDt), where F and G are (n × n) coeﬃcient
matrices, and Dt is a crisis period indicator which equals a zero-matrix during normal times and
a diagonal matrix with ones and zeros on its main diagonal during a crisis period (the number
of ones depends on the number of crisis countries). Hence, when there is a crisis, and so Dt = 0,
the instantaneous shock propagation mechanisms between the countries change from the normal
times only if G = 0. Ideally then, in Favero and Giavazzi’s model, one should test the stability
of the instantaneous linkages between the spreads by testing the null-hypothesis G = 0. Favero
and Giavazzi collect the data on the dummy variable Dt by determining turmoil periods based
on outliers in the empirical distribution of the reduced form errors of a VAR model. Once they
have these dates, they analyze news to see whether they can determine the source country of
the turmoil. In order to identify their model, Favero and Giavazzi set speciﬁc restrictions on the
spillovers. The next subsection considers an alternative approach.
3.2.2 Identifying the SVAR model
We will apply the idea presented by Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010) to identify model (3.1). They
assume a speciﬁc type of non-normal distribution, mixture-normal distribution, and we will
maintain their distributional assumption. However, inspired by their earlier idea (Lanne &
Lu¨tkepohl (2008)), we will allow for two types of periods, normal and crisis periods.
First note that any two positive deﬁnite (n × n) covariance matrices Σ1 and Σ2 can be
decomposed as Σ1 = WW
′ and Σ2 = WΨW′, where W is a nonsingular (n × n) matrix and
Ψ = diag(ψ1, . . . , ψn) is a (n× n) diagonal matrix with all the diagonal elements being strictly
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positive (for details and further references, see the appendix in Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010)). As
long as all the elements ψi are distinct from each other–and in some predetermined order (see
the discussion in the appendix, page 67), the matrix W is unique (apart from changing the signs
of the elements in every column).
Consider then a sample of T time periods where the ﬁrst T1 periods represent normal times
and the periods T1 + 1 onwards the crisis period. Assume further that the reduced form errors
of the model (3.1) are distributed as follows:
ut =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
e1t ∼ N (0,WNW′N ) with probability γ,
e2t ∼ N (0,WNΨW′N ) with probability 1− γ
(3.2)
for t = 1, . . . , T1, and
ut =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
e˜1t ∼ N (0,WCW′C) with probability γ,
e˜2t ∼ N (0,WCΨW′C) with probability 1− γ
(3.3)
for t = T1 + 1, . . . , T . So, we assume that both the mixture probability γ and the diagonal
matrix Ψ stay the same during the normal and crisis periods but allow for crisis contingent
heteroskedasticity by considering two diﬀerent (n× n) W-matrices, WN and WC .
From the distributional assumptions, it follows that the covariance matrices of ut are
ΣNu =WN (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)W′N (3.4)
and
ΣCu =WC(γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)W′C (3.5)
in the normal period and the crisis period, respectively. On the other, in the previous section it
was argued that we also have
ΣNu = BNB
′
N , (3.6)
and
ΣCu = BCB
′
C . (3.7)
From equations (3.4)–(3.7) it follows that
BN =WN (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)1/2 (3.8)
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and
BC =WC(γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)1/2. (3.9)
Hence, we can test the stability of the instantaneous linkages between the spreads by testing
the null hypothesis WN = WC under which BN = BC . The following subsection proposes to
conduct this test with the likelihood ratio (LR) test.
Notice that, given our assumptions that the parameters γ and Ψ stay constant throughout
the whole sample, the equality WN = WC is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
equality BN = BC . It should also be noticed that the identiﬁcation of the matrices BN and BC
in equations (3.8) and (3.9) is conditional on the ordering of the diagonal elements of Ψ (again,
see the discussion in the appendix, page 67). Hence, because there are n! possible permutations
of the elements {ψ1, . . . , ψn}, there are n! possibilities for the BN and BC matrices.
In this paper, we will assume that the diagonal elements of Ψ are in the descending order, i.e.
ψ1 > ψ2 > . . . > ψn. This uniquely identiﬁes the matrices BN and BC , call them for a moment
B¯N and B¯C . Denote the corresponding vector of the structural shocks as ε¯t. As it is shown in
the appendix (page 67), all the other n!−1 possible BN and BC matrices are simply column-wise
permutations of the matrices B¯N and B¯C , respectively, and all the other n! − 1 vectors of the
structural shocks are row-wise permutations of the elements in ε¯t. The implication is that, based
on the identiﬁcation of the matrices B¯N and B¯C in equations (3.8) and (3.9) (and assuming
the main diagonal elements of Ψ are in the descending order), we are not able to associate the
structural shocks with the countries. However, as long as we assume that our model in equations
(3.1)–(3.3) is true, we know that we have identiﬁed the country speciﬁc structural shocks but we
are simply unable to identify the ordering of them so that we could say which one of the shocks
corresponds to which country.
However, as our only objective is to test for the stability of the instantaneous propagation
mechanisms of the structural shocks between the spreads, this does not aﬀect the generality of
our test; stability would mean that for every possible permutation of the matrices BN and BC ,
it must hold that BN = BC . We simply choose one of these permutations to work with. For
now on, we refer to B¯N and B¯C simply as BN and BC (see the discussion in the appendix, page
68).
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3.2.3 Estimation of the model
The model described in equations (3.1)–(3.3) can be estimated with the method of maximum
likelihood (ML). During the normal times the conditional density of st is
fN (st|st−1) = γ det(WN )−1×
× exp
{
−1
2
(st − μN −ANst−1)′(WNW′N )−1(st − μN −ANst−1)
}
+
+ (1− γ) det(WN )−1det(Ψ)−1/2×
× exp
{
−1
2
(st − μN −ANst−1)′(WNΨW′N )−1(st − μN −ANst−1)
}
,
where we have ignored the constant terms of the Gaussian density function. Obviously, we get
the conditional density fC(st|st−1) during the crisis period in the same way by simply replacing
the parameters WN , μN , and AN with WC , μC , and AC , respectively. Then, by collecting all
the parameters (μN , μC , AN , AC , WN , WC , γ, and Ψ) into the vector θ, the log-likelihood
function of the model can be written as
l(θ, sT , . . . , s0) =
T1∑
t=1
log fN (st|st−1) +
T∑
t=T1+1
log fC(st|st−1),
where s0 is the initial value. This can be maximized numerically with the standard optimization
algorithms.
As explained in the previous section, we can test for the stability of the instantaneous linkages
by testing the null hypothesis WN = WC against the alternative hypothesis WN = WC . A
rejection of the null hypothesis would be an evidence against the stability of the instantaneous
linkages during a crisis. Also, as explained in section 3.2.1 there are two other potential sources
of changing government default risk during a crisis: changing intercept, and changing spillovers
and own lagged eﬀect. To test changes in the intercepts, we consider for each country separately
the null hypothesis μi,N = μi,C , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. To test changing spillovers and own lagged
eﬀects we can test the null hypotheses a−i,N = a−i,C and aii,N = aii,C for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
respectively. All the null hypotheses can be tested with the standard LR test.
3.3 Eurozone government bond spreads
In this section, we analyze the ten year government bond spreads of Ireland, Greece, Portugal,
Spain and Italy over the German bond during the years 2001–2012. The data consist of weekly
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observations of the spreads which are calculated from the secondary market yields of the bonds.
The data on yields are from the Eurostat database, and there are 626 observations for each
country. The aim is to implement the tests on changing intercepts, changing spillovers, and
changing instantaneous linkages.
In order to apply our testing approach we need to determine the normal and crisis periods.
Although the euro crisis can be seen as a continuation of the subprime crisis that began in
the U.S. ﬁnancial markets already in 2007–2008 (Mody & Sandri (2012)), we follow De Santis
(forthcoming) and set the beginning of the crisis to November 2009. This is when the newly
elected Greek government announced the revised government budget deﬁcit and debt ﬁgures
which were on unexpectedly high levels. Hence, our normal period covers the weeks from January
2001 to October 2009 (461 weeks) and the crisis period is from November 2009 to December 2012
(165 weeks).
3.3.1 Estimation of the model
The lag order of the model in equations (3.1)–(3.3) is selected with the Bayesian information
criterion. Comparing models where the lags range from one to three for the normal and crisis
periods, order one is selected for both periods. There are 116 parameters in our model. Table
3.4.3 in the appendix (page 69) reports the estimation results9. Let us ﬁrst provide a few general
remarks on the results before we conduct the actual testing.
First, the intercepts are substantially larger during the crisis period than during the normal
period. Second, there appears to be less statistically signiﬁcant spillovers between the spreads
during the crisis periods than during the normal period. In both periods, for all of the countries,
it is the own lagged eﬀect of the spread that has by far the largest coeﬃcient. Third, the number
of statistically signiﬁcant elements in the matrix WC is somewhat smaller than in the matrix
WN . As seen from equations (3.8) and (3.9), this suggests that, at least for some countries,
the number of statistically signiﬁcant instantaneous linkages decreased during the crisis period;
suggesting the shock propagation mechanisms became ”weaker” during the crisis. Fourth, the
elements of the matrix Ψ are clearly distinct from each other which is the prerequisite for using
the identiﬁcation scheme of Lanne & Lu¨tkepohl (2010). Fifth, the estimated value of γ tells
us that both during the normal and crisis periods the error term is with the probability of 77
percent from the less volatile normal distribution.
In order to study the goodness of our model, we have applied the joint quantile residuals
(JQRs) proposed by Kalliovirta & Saikkonen (2010). For a model with a mixture distribution,
9The estimation was done with the procedures in the CMLMT library of GAUSS.
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quantile residuals provide a convenient diagnostic tool (Kalliovirta (2012)), and the JQRs are
a concise way to analyze a multivariate model. When the model is correctly speciﬁed, JQRs
follow the standard normal distribution and are free from autocorrelation in the ﬁrst and second
moments. Using the diagnostic tests provided by Kalliovirta & Saikkonen (2010) we ﬁnd that
the normality test gets the p-value 0.08. Hence, the null hypothesis of normality is not rejected
at the 5% level of signiﬁcance. The p-values of the autocorrelation tests for the lags from one to
ﬁve range in between 0.44 (ﬁve lags) and 0.94 (one lag). So, there is not evidence of remaining
autocorrelations in the JQRs. Similarly, The p-values of the conditional heteroskedasticity range
in between 0.03 (one lag) and 0.32 (ﬁve lags). Hence, some evidence of remaining serial correlation
in the second moments is found. Overall, the diagnostic tests give quite good support for our
model.
3.3.2 Determinants of the government default risk
Let us now test the three possible explanations for structural breaks in the governments’ default
risk during the crisis: changing intercept, changing autoregressive coeﬃcients, and breaks in the
instantaneous linkages between the spreads. These can all be tested with the standard LR test.
This subsection presents only the test results while the next subsection interprets them.
First, in testing the stability of the intercepts, we test the null hypotheses μi,N = μi,C for all
i ∈ {Ire,Gre, Spa, Ita, Por} with the obvious country abbreviations. At the 5% percent level
of signiﬁcance, the null hypothesis is rejected for Ireland, Spain, and Italy while for Greece and
Portugal the null hypothesis is not rejected.
Second, as explained in Section 3.2.1, the testing of changing spillover eﬀects can be conducted
separately for each country by testing the null hypothesis a−i,N = a−i,C , where a−i,N (a−i,C)
denotes the ith row of matrix AN (AC), excluding the ith element aii,N (aii,C). It captures
the dynamic cross-country eﬀects of the lagged observations of the spreads of other countries
on the spread of country i during the normal (crisis) period. Also, it is of interest whether the
eﬀect of a country’s own lagged value changes or not during the crisis. This can be tested with
testing the null hypothesis aii,N = aii,C . First, at the 5% level of signiﬁcance, the null hypothesis
a−i,N = a−i,C is not rejected for Spain. For all the other countries, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Second, again at the 5% signiﬁcance level, the null hypothesis aii,N = aii,C is not rejected for
any country.
Finally, let us test the stability of the instantaneous linkages between the spreads. As ex-
plained earlier, this is obtained by testing the null hypothesisWN =WC against the alternative
hypothesis WN = WC . At the 1% level of signiﬁcance, the null hypothesis is rejected. Hence,
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the evidence speaks in favor of crisis-contingent changes in the instantaneous shock propagation
mechanisms between the spreads.
3.3.3 Summary and interpretation of the ﬁndings
Table 3.1 summarizes our ﬁndings from the previous subsection. In order to facilitate the inter-
pretation of the results, for the intercepts and the elements of matrices AN and AC , the table
shows for each rejected null hypothesis the estimated values of the parameters for the normal
period and the crisis period. This way it is easier to see if there is an increase in the parameter
values, which could help us to understand the increasing government bond spreads during the
euro debt crisis.
However, as one of our null hypothesis (a−i,N = a−i,C) jointly tests the change in all oﬀ-
diagonal elements of the ith row of the autoregressive coeﬃcient matrix, the table introduces
a measure for the joint impact of the lagged observations of other countries on the spread of
country i. This measure is
∑ |a−i,N | = ∑j =i |aij,N | (∑ |a−i,C | = ∑j =i |aij,C |) for the normal
(crisis) period and it simply sums together the absolute values of the oﬀ-diagonal elements on
the ith row of matrix AN (AC). If
∑ |a−i,N | < ∑ |a−i,C |, we can deduct that the combined
dynamic eﬀect of the spreads of the other countries on the spread of country i increases during
the crisis.
So, by ﬁrst focusing on the intercepts and the dynamic eﬀects, during the crisis, there was not
statistically signiﬁcant change in spillover eﬀects of the other countries’ spreads on the Spanish
spread. Also, the Irish and the Italian spreads became dynamically less interdependent with
the spreads of the other countries. All the three countries see a substantial increase in their
intercepts, our measure of the idiosyncratic risk factor. There was not a statistically signiﬁcant
change in the intercepts of the Greek and Portuguese spreads, but the spreads of these countries
became dynamically more interdependent with the spreads of the other countries during the
crisis. This could be one potential explanation for the Greek and Portuguese spreads becoming
more volatile during the crisis.
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We also ﬁnd that there are statistically signiﬁcant changes in the instantaneous linkages
between the countries. However, unfortunately, as explained at the end of Section 3.2.2, our
identiﬁcation method does not allow us to associate the structural shock with the countries
because the identiﬁcation of the matrices BN and BC in equations (3.8) and (3.9) depend on the
selected permutation of the diagonal elements of the matrix Ψ (we have assumed the descending
order). In our case, as we have ﬁve countries, there are 120 permutations which means there are
120 diﬀerent BN and BC matrices. On a more positive note, however, as the appendix shows
(page 68), all permutations simply reshuﬄe the order of structural shocks {ε1,t, . . . , ε5,t}. From
the perspective of the matrices BN and BC this means, that only the order of the columns
changes. So, as long as we believe that our ﬁve structural shocks correspond to ﬁve country
speciﬁc shocks, we know that, although we are unable to say which shock corresponds to which
country, in each permutation the eﬀect of the shock on the spreads stays the same: for example, if
two permutations are otherwise same except that the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth structural shocks change
places, then in the matrices BN and BC only the ﬁrst and ﬁfth columns change places.
From the perspective of our analysis the discussion in the previous paragraph implies that,
given our chose permutation of the matrix Ψ, we can measure the increases in the eﬀect of each
structural shock on each country during the crisis by computing how much the absolute value
of each element of BN changes compared to the absolute value of the corresponding element of
BC . Table 3.2 reports these calculations. So, for example the eﬀect of the ﬁrst structural shock
on Ireland decreases by 44 percent during the crisis, but at the same time its eﬀect on Greece
increases by 2508 percent. Then, for example, the ﬁrst ﬁgure was computed by comparing the
row 1, column 1 element of matrix BN ([BN ]11) to [BC ]11. For each column of the table, darker
color indicates a larger increase in the eﬀect of the corresponding structural shock. Although it
is evident from Table 3.2 that the eﬀects of the structural shocks on the countries increase in
almost all cases, there are substantial diﬀerences in the averages. For Greece and Ireland the
average increase of the eﬀects of the structural shocks are around ﬁve and three times larger,
respectively, than for Ireland, Spain, and Italy.
All in all, our results show that there are clear indications of contagion between all spreads
during the crisis. However, the spreads of Ireland, Italy and Spain seem to become dynamically
less interdependent to the spreads of the other countries. These three countries see also signiﬁcant
increases in their idiosyncratic risk factors. Hence, contagion probably explains a smaller share
of the increases in their spreads during the crisis than for Greece and Portugal. Furthermore,
while there probably was contagion of default risk from Greece and Portugal to the spreads of
the other countries, at the same time, it seems that the Greek and Portuguese spreads became
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Table 3.2: Percentage changes in the absolute values of the coeﬃcients of the structural shocks
during the crisis
Eﬀect on
Structural shocks
Average
ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4 ε5
Ireland -44 % 174 % 122 % 1991 % 1494 % 747 %
Greece 2508 % 524 % 2250 % 2743 % 4923 % 2590 %
Spain -71 % 370 % 1312 % 692 % 558 % 572 %
Italy 100 % 859 % 444 % 1300 % 437 % 628 %
Portugal 49 % 1636 % 3199 % 2345 % 399 % 1526 %
Note
For each structural shock (column), a darker color of a cell indicates
a greater increase in the corresponding coeﬃcient.
much more susceptible to changes in the spreads of the other countries during the crisis.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper presents a non-linear SVAR model to analyze the reasons behind the rising spreads
of Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal during the recent euro crisis. We identify the model
by exploiting the heteroskedasticity and non-normalities of the reduced form errors of a VAR
model. The model allows us to test for three possible reasons for a break in the stochastic process
of the spreads during the crisis: changing intercept, changing spillovers between the spreads, and
changing instantaneous interdependencies. Our test on the stability of the instantaneous inter-
dependencies corresponds to the contagion tests in the previous literature. Changing intercept
could be interpreted as an idiosyncratic change in the level of the default risk of a government.
Contagion seems to be an important factor in explaining the increasing spreads of all of the
countries considered, but there are substantial diﬀerences between the countries. It is especially
for Greece and Portugal to whom contagion of default risk from the other countries seems to be
an important factor to explain their increasing spreads. Greece and Portugal are also the only
countries who see an increase in the spillover eﬀects of the spreads of the other countries on their
spreads. Hence, it appears that, during the crisis, the Greek and Portuguese spreads became
more responsive to the changes in the spreads of the other countries.
For Ireland, Italy and Spain, in addition to the changes in the instantaneous linkages between
their spreads and those of the other countries, there are statistically signiﬁcant increases in their
the idiosyncratic risk factors. Furthermore, unlike with Greece and Portugal, the spreads of
these three countries either become dynamically less interdependent with the spreads of the
other countries or there is not a statistically signiﬁcant change in the spillover eﬀects.
The paper provides several possible research questions for future research. First, our model
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assumes that the structural shocks (but not the reduced form errors) are homoskedastic. This,
of course, need not be the case, and an increase also in the variances of the structural shocks
would be an interesting extension. Second, it would be interesting to further investigate the
identiﬁcation method that is applied in this paper so that one could associate the structural
shocks with the countries. Here, we needed to content ourselves with testing the stability of
their eﬀects. Third, to allow for an endogenously determined crisis period would be a logical
extension of the model framework.
Appendix
Mathematical appendix
This appendix shows why the matrices BN and BC in equations (3.8)–(3.9) become uniquely
identiﬁed once we assume that the diagonal elements of the matrix Ψ are in some predetermined
order. We also show why this assumption does not aﬀect the generality of our test for the
stability of the instantaneous linkages.
Uniqueness of the B-matrices
Consider ﬁrst the covariance matrix of the reduced form errors during normal times, that is the
matrix ΣNu in equation (3.4).
Take an arbitrary (n × n) permutation matrix P. For permutation matrices it holds that
P′P = In. Hence, we can equally well write ΣNu in the following way:
ΣNu =WN (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)W′N
= γWNW
′
N + (1− γ)WNΨW′N
= γWNP
′PW′N + (1− γ)WNP′PΨP′PW′N
= γWNP
′(W1P′)′ + (1− γ)WNP′PΨP′(WNP′)′
=WNP
′(γIn + (1− γ)PΨP′)(WNP′)′
= WˆN (γIn + (1− γ)Ψˆ)Wˆ′N ,
where WˆN = WNP
′ is a column-wise permutation of the matrix WN , and Ψˆ = PΨP′ is a
column- and row-wise permutation of the diagonal matrix Ψ. This means that, because all the
oﬀ-diagonal elements of Ψ are zero, Ψˆ is also a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements of
Ψ reordered.
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So, instead of the matrix BN in equation (3.8), we could choose the following matrix as our
normal times B-matrix:
BˆN = WˆN (γIn + (1− γ)Ψˆ)1/2. (3.4.10)
BˆN is equal to matrix BN only when P = In. Because there are n! diﬀerent (n×n) permutation
matrices P, there are equally many possibilities for our normal period B-matrix. By similar
reasoning, we could, instead of choosing the matrix BC in equation (3.9), choose as our crisis
period B-matrix the following matrix:
BˆC = WˆC(γIn + (1− γ)Ψˆ)1/2, (3.4.11)
where WˆC =WCP
′ is again a column-wise permutation of the matrix WC .
Because the mapping Ψˆ = PΨP′ is a bijection and the elements ψ1, . . . , ψn are assumed dis-
tinct, determining the order of the diagonal elements of Ψˆ uniquely determines the permutation
matrix P. Hence, the matrices WN and WC are also determined and, so, the B-matrices.
Generality of our test for stability of instantaneous linkages
Finally, let us show why the requirement to select one permutationP does not aﬀect the generality
of our test for stability of instantaneous linkages. First, because the part
(γIn + (1− γ)PΨP′)1/2 = (P(γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)P′)1/2
in the equations (3.4.10)–(3.4.11) is diagonal, it equals to
P(γIn + (1− γ)Ψ1)1/2P′.
Then it follows that, for example, equation (3.4.10) can be written as
BˆN =WNP
′P(γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)1/2P′
=WN (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)1/2P′
= BNP
′.
Hence, the matrix BˆN is simply a column-wise permutation of the matrix BN in equation (3.8)
which corresponds to the permutation P = In.
Denote as εˆt the vector of structural shock corresponding to matrix BˆN during normal times.
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Then, from the equality ut = BNεt = BˆN εˆt, it follows that
εˆt = (BˆN )
−1BNεt = (BNP′)−1BNεt = P′−1B−1N BNεt = Pεt,
where P′−1 = P is a result from P being orthogonal. So, εˆt is simply a row-wise permutation
on the vector εt. The same reasoning holds for the crisis period.
Hence, our identiﬁcation of the matrices BN and BC in equations (3.8) and (3.9), respec-
tively, does not allow us to associate the corresponding structural shocks with the spreads of
the countries, although assuming that the diagonal elements of Ψ are in descending, uniquely
identiﬁes one permutation of the matrices matrices BN and BC . Notwithstanding, following
Favero & Giavazzi (2002), as long as we believe that our extension of their model in equations
(3.1)–(3.3) correctly depicts the stochastic process of the spreads, we know that the structural
shocks are country speciﬁc shocks to the spreads. So, all the n! permutations of the vector of
structural shocks simply reshuﬄe the individual shocks and, more importantly for our purposes,
all the permutations of the matrices BN and BC measure the same eﬀects. This means that by
selecting one of the permutations to work with, we can always test the stability of the matrices
BN and BC but we can not say which structural shock corresponds to which country.
Parameter estimates
Table 3.4.3: Estimation results (standard errors are in parentheses)
Dependent variable
Sire,t Sgre,t Sspa,t Sita,t Spor,t
Normal period
Intercepts −0.009 0.003 −0.005 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Sire,t−1 0.917∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.016 −0.035∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.016)
Sgre,t−1 0.171∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032)
Sspa,t−1 0.050 0.039 0.959∗∗∗ 0.024 0.098∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.035)
Sita,t−1 −0.085 0.032 −0.002 0.913∗∗∗ −0.028
(0.048) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.043)
Spor,t−1 −0.097∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.05∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.036)
69
Crisis period
Intercepts 0.232∗∗∗ 0.243 0.096 0.086∗∗ 0.028
(0.088) (0.148) (0.05) (0.042) (0.092)
Sire,t−1 0.968∗∗∗ 0.063 −0.014 −0.010 0.059∗∗
(0.026) (0.044) (0.015) (0.013) (0.027)
Sgre,t−1 0.013 0.946∗∗∗ 0.004 0.002 0.089∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.027) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017)
Sspa,t−1 0.018 −0.180 0.952∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.304∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.132) (0.040) (0.036) (0.076)
Sita,t−1 −0.200∗∗ 0.113 −0.035 0.909∗∗∗ 0.123
(0.097) (0.192) (0.059) (0.053) (0.110)
Spor,t−1 0.038 0.046 0.027 0.023 0.854∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.066) (0.022) (0.019) (0.04)
Matrix 0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ 0.003 0.020∗∗∗
WN (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.003 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
0.004∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.004 0.020∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
0.005∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
0.008∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.006∗∗ 0.008 0.036∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
Matrix −0.010 0.012 0.004 0.056 0.323∗∗∗
WC (0.017) (0.029) (0.037) (0.084) (0.027)
−0.417∗∗∗ −0.057 −0.064 0.207∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.131) (0.109) (0.08) (0.081)
0.001 −0.007 0.049 0.161∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.015) (0.044) (0.034) (0.022) (0.049)
−0.011 0.061 0.052 0.116∗∗∗ 0.042
(0.019) (0.042) (0.055) (0.023) (0.036)
−0.011 0.078 −0.191∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.14) (0.076) (0.07) (0.069)
Matrix ψ1 ψ2 ψ3 ψ4 ψ5
Ψ 71.558∗∗∗ 25.446∗∗∗ 16.991∗∗∗ 8.013∗∗∗ 3.985∗∗∗
(10.142) (3.584) (2.359) (1.18) (0.6)
Mixture prob. 0.770∗∗∗
γ (0.018)
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NOTE:
Standard errors obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-likelihood function.
(∗∗) / (∗∗∗) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 5 % / 1 % signiﬁcance level.
The log-likelihood function gets value 6789.10
Abbreviations: Ireland (ire), Greece (gre), Spain (spa), Italy (ita), and Portugal (por).
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Chapter 4
Uncertainty and Business Cycles
Abstract1
The paper develops a vector autoregressive model with autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity in mean eﬀects to decompose the eﬀect of a stock market crash
on industrial production into two components, the eﬀect of negative returns and the
eﬀect of higher volatility. Our special attention is on the eﬀect of volatility as it is our
proxy for business cycle eﬀects of uncertainty. We estimate the model with US data
from 1919 to the mid 2013 and ﬁnd uncertainty signiﬁcantly countercyclical. Impulse
response analysis shows that a monthly drop of ten percent in stock market prices
is followed by a cumulative decline of three percent in the industrial production. Of
this decline, around two thirds are explained by higher uncertainty.
1This chapter has appeared as HECER Discussion Paper No. 373 (2013).
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4.1 Introduction
Does uncertainty aggravate business cycles? The recent ﬁnancial crisis has again brought up this
question. For example, the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in Autumn 2008 was followed
by a jump in the US stock market volatility which in its turn coincided with declining industrial
production (see Figure 4.1). There are many theoretical reasons why higher uncertainty could
cause a negative business cycle. For example, higher uncertainty might lead ﬁrms to scale down
and postpone their investments and hiring (Bernanke (1983), Bloom (2009)), or consumers to
postpone purchases of durable goods (Romer (1990)2). On the other hand, declining (and hence
usually more volatile) stock market prices in a recession could be a consequence of investors
expecting lower future dividends and capital gains.
Either way, one would assume that stock market returns and volatility predict business cycles.
This paper brings together two (possible) real economic eﬀects of a stock market crash: the ﬁrst
order eﬀect of negative returns, and the second order eﬀects via higher uncertainty which we
measure by stock market volatility3. The methodological contribution of this paper is to extend
the multivariate general autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model of Vrontos
et al. (2003) to a vector autoregressive (VAR) model with GARCH-in-mean eﬀects. This model
provides an ideal framework to study both jointly and separately the importance of the two
possible eﬀects of a stock market crash.
The variables of our model are the monthly stock market return and the change in industrial
production. In order to to study the business cycle eﬀects of negative stock market returns and
higher uncertainty, we need to identify a structural shock that generates stock market surprises.
By referring to the high autocorrelation in the monthly capacity utilization in the manufacturing
industry, we argue that the production of an industrial company necessarily is quite persistent.
This enables us to identify one of the structural shocks of our model as a stock market speciﬁc
shock which is interpreted as ﬁnancial news. Then, ﬁnancial news can aﬀect the stock market
returns immediately but the industrial production only with a lag. Hence, our ﬁnancial news
variable can generate unexpected increases in the stock market volatility. The model can be
estimated with the method of maximum likelihood (ML), and we can statistically test the signif-
icance of the ﬁrst and second order eﬀects of a stock market crash on the industrial production.
Also, our model allows us to separately study the importance of these two eﬀects by means of
2Actually, Romer (1990) simply extends the intuition of the ”wait and see” hypothesis for investments of
Bernanke (1983) to consumable durable goods.
3Although there are many other possible measures of uncertainty, stock market volatility is probably the most
common one. Also, it is highly correlated with the other measures (see, for example, Arnold & Vrugt (2008),
Bloom (2009)).
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Figure 4.1: Monthly US stock market returns, estimated stock market volatility, and change in
the US industrial production in January 2007–December 2010
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Note: Here volatility of the stock market returns is computed as the conditional standard deviation of the returns
implied by the univariate GARCH(1,1) model estimated from our full sample period (January 1919–July 2013).
Sources: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm (stock market data), St.Louis FED’s FRED database
(industrial production), and own calculations.
impulse responses.
In the empirical application, we estimate the model with US data covering the period from
the beginning of 1919 to the mid 2013. According to the estimation results the stock market
volatility (as well as the return) is a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of the change in industrial
production. Furthermore, as the theoretical contemplations would predict, ﬁnancial volatility is
countercyclical, meaning that higher volatility decreases the growth rate of industrial production.
The impulse response analysis shows that a (monthly) negative stock market shock of ten percent
is followed by a slump in the growth rate of industrial production that lasts for around two
years, with the cumulative eﬀect on the industrial production of roughly minus three percent.
Approximately half of the duration of the business cycle is explained by the direct eﬀects of
negative stock market returns. The other half is due to the higher volatility, or uncertainty.
As the emphasis of the paper is to study the business cycle eﬀects of uncertainty, it is closely
related to the literature on the linkages between ﬁnancial and macroeconomic volatility. The
question of predicting ﬁnancial volatility with macro variables (and their volatility), is of course
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an old theme in the ﬁnancial literature (Schwert (1989) is a classical reference, whereas Beltratti
& Morana (2006), Diebold & Yilmaz (2008), and Engle et al. (2013) are more recent ones, only
to mention a few). According to Diebold & Yilmaz (2008) the main ﬁnding of this research is
that, perhaps unsurprisingly, stock market volatility is higher in recessions. This is also the main
conclusion of Hamilton & Lin (1996) who, furthermore, notice that it is the higher stock market
volatility that precedes a fall in the US industrial production by one month. However, in their
model stock market volatility and industrial production follow the same latent process which
determines the state of the economy. Hence, they do not consider the direct links between the
two variables.
The literature that studies the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁnancial volatility is not very volu-
minous but growing, especially due to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. From the perspective of this
paper, the most relevant part of this literature consists of the papers that explicitly focus on
the eﬀects of uncertainty or volatility shocks. The main methodology of this line of research is
to write down and calibrate a theoretical macroeconomic model where the uncertainty shock is
modeled as a second order shock to the productivity process (see, for example, Bloom (2009),
Bloom et al. (2012)). The main ﬁnding is that uncertainty shocks can create business cycles that
last for about six to twelve months. Our result on the magnitude of the second order eﬀect of a
stock market crash is consistent with this.
There are only few truly empirical studies on the subject. Alexopoulos & Cohen (2009),
Beetsma & Giuliodori (2012), and Denis & Kannan (2013) are some rare exceptions. As the
model speciﬁcations of these papers come quite close to our model, we will discuss them (and
problems in their identiﬁcation) in detail later on. Also Bachmann et al. (2013), and Baker
& Bloom (2013) use statistical methods to determine the business cycle eﬀects of uncertainty.
But the methods and data they use are quite diﬀerent from ours. As a measure of uncertainty,
the former uses dispersion of forecasts for economic conditions of manufacturing companies. The
latter considers an event study framework where natural disasters, coups, and revolutions are used
as exogenous sources of uncertainty shocks. Overall, these studies ﬁnd that higher uncertainty
has a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on economic growth. Our results reconﬁrm this
and, also highlight the relative importance of the second order eﬀects to the ﬁrst order eﬀects in
explaining a recession.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model
and discuss its estimation and identiﬁcation of the structural shocks. In Section 4.3, we present
the estimation results on the US data. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.
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4.2 The Empirical Framework
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the model for the joint dynamics of industrial production and
the stock market return and discuss its estimation. Then, we discuss both the identiﬁcation of
the structural shocks and the econometric analysis of the identiﬁed model. Finally, we brieﬂy
compare the model to a number of similar ones in the literature.
4.2.1 The Model
Let us denote by Δindt the monthly percentage change in industrial production and by rt the
monthly stock market return. We collect the variables into the (2×1) vector yt = [Δindt, rt]′ and
assume that yt follows a bivariate GARCH model with a non-zero conditional mean. Speciﬁcally,
we assume the following multivariate speciﬁcation of the (G)ARCH-in-mean model of Engle et al.
(1987):
A(L)yt = μ+Cht + ut, (4.2.1)
where A(L) = I2 − A1L − . . . − ApLp is a (2 × 2) matrix polynomial, μ is a (2 × 1) vector
of the intercepts, C is a (2 × 2) coeﬃcient matrix, and ht = [h1,t, h2,t]′ is a (2 × 1) vector of
the conditional volatilities h1,t and h2,t of the structural shocks ε1,t and ε2,t, respectively. The
structural shocks are discussed shortly. Finally, ut = [uind,t, ur,t]
′ is the (2 × 1) reduced from
error vector. In the empirical application, the order of A(L) is determined with the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC).
To complete the model, we assume that the reduced form errors are a linear function of the
two structural shocks with the following simple speciﬁcation:
ut = Bεt, (4.2.2)
where εt = [ε1,t, ε2,t] is the (2× 1) vector of the structural shocks, and B is a (2× 2) coeﬃcient
matrix. To identify the shocks, we assume that B is the following lower triangular matrix:
B =
⎡
⎢⎣ 1 0
b 1
⎤
⎥⎦ . (4.2.3)
This assumption identiﬁes the second structural shock (ε2,t) as a stock market speciﬁc shock.
The assumption that the diagonal elements are equal to one restricts the number of parameters
and, hence, normalizes the model. The structural shocks are assumed to be mutually orthogonal
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and to follow univariate GARCH(1,1) processes with Gaussian conditional distributions:
εi,t|It−1 ∼ N(0, h2i,t), (4.2.4)
h2i,t = αi + βi · ε2i,t−1 + γi · h2i,t−1 (4.2.5)
for i = 1, 2. Here It−1 denotes the information set up to time period t − 1 (the period t − 1
included), and αi, βi, and γi, i = 1, 2, are parameters.
The multivariate GARCH model in equations (4.2.2)–(4.2.5) was proposed by Vrontos et al.
(2003). The model is well deﬁned under rather mild assumptions. To see this, collect ﬁrst the
conditional variances h21,t and h
2
2,t into the (2× 2) diagonal matrix H2t = diag(h21,t, h22,t). Then,
given speciﬁcation (4.2.3), the conditional covariance matrix of the reduced form error vector ut,
Σu|It−1 = BH2tB′,
is always positive deﬁnite as long as the conditional variances h21,t and h
2
r,t are well deﬁned. In
order to guarantee this, we follow Vrontos et al. and assume that αi > 0, βi ≥ 0, and γi ≥ 0 for
i = 1, 2.
The model can be estimated with the method of ML. Assume a sample of T observations,
and denote by Yt−1 the vector of observations up to the time period t − 1 (yt−1 included).
Then, given the initial values {y0, . . . ,y−p,h0, ε0}, the conditional density function of the model
(4.2.1)–(4.2.5) becomes
f(yt|Yt−1) =det(BHt)−1×
exp
{
−1
2
(A(L)yt − μ−Cht)′(BH2tB′)−1(A(L)yt − μ−Cht)
}
,
where we have omitted the constant terms of the Gaussian distribution. After collecting all the
parameters of the model into the vector δ, the log-likelihood function of the model can be written
as
l(δ,YT ) =− T × ln(det(B))−
T∑
t=1
ln(det(Ht))−
− 1
2
T∑
t=1
(A(L)yt − μ−Cht)′(BH2tB′)−1(A(L)yt − μ−Cht)
which can be maximized numerically with standard optimization algorithms. In our empirical
analysis, we take the ﬁrst p observations of y as the initial values for the dependent variables,
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set h0 equal to the sample standard deviations of the residuals uˆind,t and uˆr,t of a standard pth
order VAR model estimated from the full sample, and ﬁnally assume that ε0 = 0.
4.2.2 Identiﬁcation and Econometrics Analysis
Assumption (4.2.3) on matrix B serves two purposes. On the one hand, as mentioned above, it
guarantees that the model is well deﬁned under the stated assumptions (see Vrontos et al. (2003,
314–15)), on the other hand it identiﬁes the second structural shock (ε2,t) as the stock market
speciﬁc shock, a shock which aﬀects the stock market returns instantaneously, in period t, but
industrial production only from period t+ 1 onwards.
The second shock ε2,t can be interpreted as ﬁnancial news. As we are especially interested
in the eﬀects of unexpected surges in uncertainty on the real side of an economy, we will restrict
our attention to studying the business cycle eﬀects of this shock. The ﬁrst structural shock
(ε1,t) does not have any speciﬁc interpretation here. It is a shock that can aﬀect both the real
sector and the stock markets contemporaneously, and hence it could incorporate, for example,
productivity shocks.
Why does it make sense to assume that ﬁnancial news in period t instantly aﬀects only
the stock markets but not the industrial production? The monthly capacity utilization in the
US manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas sectors (in 1972–2012) is a highly persistent
variable (with the coeﬃcient estimate of 0.99 in a ﬁrst order autoregressive model). Hence, a
high level of orders of an industrial company this month predicts a high level of orders also in the
next month. This seems natural as probably many industrial products are (investment) goods
whose production take more than a month. Assume there is negative ﬁnancial news, such as
the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers, in period t. During this same period, given the high
persistence in the industrial orders, the companies would still be busy in fulﬁlling their orders
from the previous months, and so, the shock would not aﬀect the current production. Of course,
it could aﬀect the number of new orders received in period t and, hence, the future production,
but this is exactly the eﬀect we are interested in.
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let us brieﬂy discuss the limitations of our identiﬁca-
tion scheme. Such dramatic news as the default of the Lehman Brothers and the subsequent stock
market crash could of course be a consequence, not necessarily the cause of slowing economic ac-
tivity; after all, stock market prices should reﬂect discounted future dividends and capital gains.
However, such reversed causality between stock market prices and future economic activity is
irrelevant for our purposes of quantifying the business cycle eﬀects of uncertainty shocks. To
this end, we only need to identify a stock market speciﬁc shock that can generate stock market
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volatility surprises. With such a shock available we can separate the direct eﬀect of the drop in
the stock market prices from the volatility eﬀect.
To take an example, consider Figure 4.1, which shows that after the default of the Lehman
Brothers, the US stock market prices collapsed and the estimated volatility tripled. Whether the
subsequent stock market crash was the cause or the consequence of the recession, the upsurge
in the volatility suggests that at least many investors perceived a huge rise in the uncertainty
over the actual and future state of the US economy. Our question is whether there is any
evidence of this uncertainty prolonging the slump as the theoretical literature referred to in
Introduction suggests. This means that higher volatility should be an important variable in
explaining variation in the industrial production.
In order to study this question we can ﬁrst test for the statistical signiﬁcance of the parameter
c1,2 (the ﬁrst row, second column element of the matrix C in equation (4.2.1)). This measures
the direct eﬀect of the volatility of the structural shock ε2,t on industrial production. One would
expect that c1,2 ≤ 0, i.e. higher volatility tends to decrease industrial production. Furthermore,
assume a negative realization of ε2,t, say, at period T0, and call it ε˜2. According to our assump-
tions, ε˜2 aﬀects the stock market return already at period T0 but the growth rate of industrial
production only from period T0 + 1 onwards. In our model, the eﬀect of ε˜2 on ΔindT0+1 comes
from two channels; on the one hand via the lagged (negative) stock market return, and on the
other hand via the conditional variance of ε2,t which, according to equation (4.2.5), increases at
period T0 + 1. The ﬁrst channel corresponds to the ﬁrst order eﬀect of a stock market shock,
and the second channel to the second order, or uncertainty, eﬀect.
The dynamic eﬀects of ε˜2 and the importance of the two channels on the growth rate of
industrial production can be studied with two diﬀerent impulse response functions. First, as
suggested by Elder (2003)4, we can calculate the total impulse response function by simply
introducing ε˜2 and numerically compute the responses of rt and Δindt to the shock. This gives
us the total eﬀect of ε˜2. (The details of our actual calculations are explained in the next section.)
Then, in order to separate the eﬀect of higher volatility on Δindt from the total eﬀect of ε˜2, we
can calculate the responses of the system to another shock which we refer as a ”volatility jump”.
This jump corresponds to an increase only in h22,t at period T0 + 1 which exactly matches the
increase in it due to the shock ε˜2. The two impulse response functions of Δindt give us the total
eﬀect of the stock market shock and the eﬀect of higher volatility on the growth rate of industrial
production. The diﬀerence of the two (at each period) tells us the ﬁrst order eﬀect.
4Elder (2003) discusses in detail the diﬀerences in the impulse response functions of a standard homoskedastic
VAR model and the VAR-GARCH-in-means model.
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4.2.3 Related Literature
Hamilton & Lin (1996) model the joint dynamics of the changes in the US industrial production
and the excess stock market return. The framework they consider is a bivariate Markov-switching
VAR model with ARCH-eﬀects. Their main ﬁnding is that both variables are more volatile
in recessions and that increasing volatility in stock markets precedes declines in the industrial
production by one month. This result supports our identifying assumption.
Alexopoulos & Cohen (2009), Denis & Kannan (2013), and Beetsma & Giuliodori (2012) study
the business cycle eﬀect of uncertainty (ﬁnancial market volatility) with the VAR framework.
Unlike us, the ﬁrst two papers assume that volatility shocks (to ﬁnancial markets) aﬀect the real
sector immediately but that the real sector speciﬁc shocks aﬀect volatility only with a lag. On
the basis of the discussion above, this seems an incorrect timing of events. At the very least, we
should expect shocks to real sector to have an immediate eﬀect on the ﬁnancial markets.
Like us, Beetsma & Giuliodori (2012) assume that stock market volatility aﬀects the real
sector only with a lag, but strangely enough they include the quarterly return of the Dow Jones
index and its volatility as separate variables in their VAR model and assume that the return
can immediately aﬀect the volatility but not vice versa. However, as their volatility variable is
necessarily a function of the returns data, dealing these two variables as separate time series is
questionable. In our framework, the eﬀect of returns on the volatility is explicitly modeled, and
the parameters of the model jointly estimated.
Nonetheless, Alexopoulos & Cohen (2009), Denis & Kannan (2013), and Beetsma & Giuliodori
(2012) ﬁnd that uncertainty (or volatility) shocks can predict recessions which, depending on the
size of the shock, last one to two years. In the next section we ﬁnd quite similar results with our
model ﬁtted to US data.
4.3 Uncertainty and Business Cycles in the US
In order to estimate the model, we consider monthly percentage changes in the US stock market
prices (returns rt) and industrial production (Δindt).
5 The stock market prices are downloaded
from Robert Shiller’s home page6 and here we use the nominal prices (the correlation between
the nominal and real prices is 0.96). The industrial production data is from the online database
(FRED) of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis. As the industrial production data is available
only from January 1919 onwards, our data on monthly changes covers the period from February
5The variables are computed in the following way: Δindt = 100× (ln indt− ln indt−1), and rt = 100× (lnPt−
lnPt−1), where Pt is the monthly stock market price index.
6http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
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1919 to July 2013. This means that there are 1134 observations.
4.3.1 Estimation Results and Testing
Table 4.3.1 reports the estimation results for the model (4.2.1)–(4.2.5) where the lag length p is
set to two by the BIC.7 In the equation of the change in industrial production, all the coeﬃcients
of the lagged returns and changes in industrial production are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
signiﬁcance level. On the contrary, in explaining the stock market return, only the ﬁrst lag of
the return seems to have a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient at the 5% signiﬁcance level while
the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst lag of the change in industrial production is statistically signiﬁcant
only at the 10% signiﬁcance level. All the parameters of the GARCH-processes are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
As explained in Section 4.2.2 our main interest is in testing whether the coeﬃcient of h2,t, the
conditional volatility of the shock market speciﬁc structural shock, on the change in industrial
production is statistically diﬀerent from zero. Its estimated value in Table 4.3.1 equals -0.08
and, hence, is negative as expected. The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the null
hypothesis of c1,2 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis of c1,2 = 0 gets value 9.40, which means
that the null hypothesis is rejected at any reasonable signiﬁcance level. Hence, we conclude
that uncertainty is a statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variable for the changes in industrial
production. It is also countercyclical in the sense that when it rises, as it usually does in
recessions, it decreases the growth rate of industrial production.
Neither of the conditional standard deviations seem to be statistically signiﬁcant variables
in explaining the stock market return. However, somewhat surprisingly, the coeﬃcient of the
conditional standard deviation of the ﬁrst structural shock appears to be a statistically signiﬁcant
predictor of the change in industrial production. However, as the robustness checks in Section
4.3.3 below shows, this result seems to depend on the fact that our sample period includes the
Great Depression of the 1930’s. As a ﬁnal remark on Table 4.3.1, notice that the parameter b
of the matrix B in equation (4.2.3) is statistically signiﬁcant only at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
Hence, there is some weak evidence of the second structural shock being a real sector speciﬁc
shock.
4.3.2 Impulse Response Analysis
In order to study the economic signiﬁcance of uncertainty in explaining recessions, we generate a
stock market crash by introducing a large negative realization of ε2,t. The magnitude of the shock
7All the estimations were done with the procedures in the CMLMT library of GAUSS.
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Table 4.3.1: Estimation results (standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variables
Δindt rt
Intercepts 0.239 0.560
(0.101) (0.384)
Δindt−1 0.244 -0.135
(0.033) (0.075)
rt−1 0.020 0.269
(0.007) (0.033)
Δindt−2 0.151 0.037
(0.033) (0.077)
rt−2 0.033 -0.061
(0.007) (0.033)
h1,t 0.241 0.001
(0.060) (0.124)
h2,t -0.080 0.022
(0.027) (0.113)
h1,t h2,t
Intercepts 0.062 0.622
(0.013) (0.169)
h21,t−1 0.646 · · ·
(0.032) · · ·
h22,t−1 · · · 0.832
· · · (0.021)
ε1,t−1 0.394 · · ·
(0.048) · · ·
ε2,t−1 · · · 0.140
· · · (0.022)
uind,t ur,t
ε1,t−1 · · · 0.117
· · · (0.077)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are
obtained from the inverse Hessian of the
log-likelihood function.
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is minus ten. This generates a drop of ten percentage points in the monthly stock market return
which roughly corresponds to the average (-14%) of the monthly returns in September–October
2008, the period when the Lehman Brothers defaulted (Figure 4.1).
The shock happens in period 0. We assume that in period -1 the variables equal their long
run levels (unconditional means) which are computed based of our parameter estimates. The
long run levels (monthly percentage changes) of stock market return and the change in industrial
production are 0.72 percent and 0.37 percent, respectively. When these are transformed into
yearly percentage changes, we get 8.64 percent stock market return and 4.44 percent increase in
the industrial production. These are reasonable ﬁgures, which lends support to our estimation
results. Notice also that in our model there is no feedback in equations (4.2.4)–(4.2.5) from
the variables of yt back to the GARCH processes of the conditional variances of the structural
shocks. This makes the calculation of the impulse responses straightforward.
Figure 4.2 reports the impulse responses of the stock market return and the change in indus-
trial production to the stock market shock in period 0 with the 95% conﬁdence intervals8. The
impulse responses are demeaned with the long run levels of rt and Δindt in order to highlight
the eﬀect of the shock. Hence, for example the period 0 value of -10 for rt means that, due to
the shock, the stock market return is ten percentage points lower than the return in the long
run. Gradually, both variables converge back to their long run levels (level zero in the graphs).
For both variables the drop is signiﬁcant. As the upper panel of Figure 4.2 shows, for the
stock market return the highest impact of the shock is right after the shock (period 0), and
the stock market accommodates to the shock quite quickly; after four to six months the stock
market return has converged back to its long run level. In period 4, there is even a small boom
in the stock markets as the volatility has started to decrease from its high levels right after the
shock (the volatility time series is not reported) and uncertainty decreases. In the lower panel,
as assumed in our model, the eﬀect of the shock on the change in the industrial production in
period 0 is nil. The highest impact of the shock on Δindt comes three months after the shock,
and the negative eﬀect lasts much longer than for the stock market return. It is only after around
two to two and a half years (!) that Δindt has basically converged back to its long run level.
8The computation of the 95% conﬁdence intervals was carried out in ﬁve steps: (Step 1) the ML estimates of
the parameters of the model were used to simulate a data set of the same size as our actual data. The simulation
of the data consisted of three phases: ﬁrst, the initial values of ε1,t and ε2,t were drawn from normal distributions
with the variances equal to the long run values of h21,t and h
2
2,t, respectively. Second, the estimated univariate
GARCH processes (4.2.4)–(4.2.5) were used to simulate the realizations of the structural shocks. Third, the
simulated structural shocks (and the estimated equations (4.2.1)–(4.2.3)) were used to construct the new data
set on rt and Δindt. In ’Step2’, the model was re-estimated for these new (simulated) data. ’Step 3’ consisted
of using the new parameter estimates from the previous step to compute the impulse responses of rt and Δindt
to a negative realization of ε2,t = −10 (the same magnitude as in the original case). In ’Step 4’, the previous
three steps were repeated 10000 times. Finally, in ’Step 5’, for each lag separately, we ordered the 10000 impulse
responses into ascending order and selected the elements that were the 500th and 9500th in order. We did the
ﬁfth step separately for both variables, rt and Δindt.
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Figure 4.2: Response of rt and Δindt to a negative stock market speciﬁc shock
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Note: Negative stock market speciﬁc shock at period t=0. The panels show demeaned impulse responses (de-
meaned by the long-run levels of the variables). Hence, the levels rt = 0 and Δindt = 0 correspond to the long
run stock market return and the growth rate of industrial production, respectively. The bootstrapped conﬁdence
intervals are based on 10000 replications (for details, see footnote 8).
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Figure 4.3 decomposes the total eﬀect of the stock market crash into the ﬁrst and second
order eﬀects (for details on the concepts, see the end of Section 4.2.2). The second order eﬀect
measures the share that uncertainty explains of the negative business cycle following the stock
market crash. As seen from the ﬁgure, the ﬁrst order eﬀect lasts only around nine to ten months
which is consistent with the quick recovery in the stock market return. After this, for around
one more year, it is only the eﬀect of higher volatility that still drags down the growth rate
of industrial production. At the trough of the business cycle (period 3), uncertainty explains
around one third of the minus 0.6 percentage points deviation of Δindt from its long term level.
Figure 4.4 shows the cumulative eﬀect of the stock market crash on the change in industrial
production and decomposes it into the shares explained by the ﬁrst and second order eﬀects. The
cumulative eﬀects were computed by summing the demeaned impulse responses in the previous
ﬁgure. As Figure 4.4 shows, the total cumulative eﬀect of the stock market crash on Δindt is
around minus three percentage points. This means that around two years after the shock, the
level of industrial production is three percent lower than without the shock (assuming the growth
rate of industrial production at its long run level). As seen from the ﬁgure, the second order
eﬀect, or uncertainty, explains around two thirds of the total cumulative eﬀect. Based on Figure
4.3, this result is intuitive as it is the second order eﬀect that prolongs the business cycle with
another year while the ﬁrst order eﬀect dies out quickly. Clearly, uncertainty is an important
factor in propagating and prolonging business cycles.
4.3.3 Robustness Checks
Beetsma & Giuliodori (2012) argue that the responsiveness of the real sector of an economy
to stock market volatility shocks changes in time. They ﬁnd that, after the 1980’s, the GDP
growth has become less responsive to volatility shocks. This raises the question of how robust
our ﬁndings are for diﬀerent time intervals, especially as our sample period includes two severe
economic crises, one at the beginning and the other at the end of the sample.
Table 4.3.2 shows the estimates of the coeﬃcients c1,1 and c1,2 for a number of subsamples.
Encouragingly, the estimate of the eﬀect of stock market volatility on the industrial production
(the coeﬃcient c1,2) is always negative with p-values below 0.05, but we also reconﬁrm the ﬁnding
of Beetsma & Giuliodori (2012) that the absolute value of c1,2 decreases towards the end of the
sample period. Also, according to Table 4.3.2 the coeﬃcient c1,1 appears to become statistically
insigniﬁcant towards the end of the sample. It seems that this coeﬃcient gets its largest value in
the period including the Great Depression and the Second World War. Overall, our main ﬁnding
that uncertainty is countercyclical, seems robust.
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Figure 4.3: Decomposition of the IRF of Δindt
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Note: The ﬁrst order eﬀect refers to the direct eﬀect of ε2,t on Δindt via stock market returns, the second order
eﬀect refers to the eﬀect of ε2,t on Δindt via higher h2,t only, or uncertainty. For details, see the end of Section
4.2.2.
Table 4.3.2: Robustness of volatility coeﬃcients (p-values in parentheses)
Time period c1,1 c1,2
Full sample period
0.24 -0.08
(0.00) (0.00)
Feb/1919–Dec/1954
0.43 -0.16
(0.00) (0.00)
Jan/1955–Dec/1989
0.07 -0.22
(0.73) (0.03)
Jan/1955–Jul/2013
0.21 -0.09
(0.23) (0.02)
Note: p-values are based on the standard
errors as detailed in the note to Table 4.3.1,
c1,1 (c1,2) is the eﬀect of h1,t (h2,t) on Δindt.
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative eﬀect of the stock market speciﬁc shock on Δindt
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Note: For explanations, see the note to Figure 4.3.
4.4 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to study the business cycle eﬀects of uncertainty. According to
theory, one expects uncertainty to be countercyclical. To examine this, we proposed measuring
uncertainty with stock market volatility and introduced a bivariate VAR-GARCH-in-mean model
for the monthly stock market return and the change in industrial production. We identiﬁed stock
market speciﬁc structural shock which can generate volatility surprises whose eﬀects on industrial
production we study. The framework enables us to test the statistical signiﬁcance of uncertainty
in explaining variations in the industrial production.
In analysis of US data from the beginning of 1919 to the mid 2013, we found that, in ac-
cordance with the theoretical models, uncertainty is countercyclical with statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient. The result was robust for varied time periods. The impulse response analysis shows
that a ten percent monthly decrease in the stock market prices is followed by a slump in the
growth rate of the industrial production that lasts for about two years and leaves the industrial
production three percent lower than without the stock market crash. Roughly half of the dura-
tion of the business cycle and two thirds of the total cumulative eﬀect of the stock market shock
are explained by higher uncertainty.
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